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Infectious disease outbreaks have occurred frequently throughout history. 
Quarantine, public awareness campaigns, antiviral prophylaxis, school 
closures and vaccine allocation are the most commonly used interventions to 
counter such outbreaks. A majority of the current research in in-silico 
intervention planning assumes complete knowledge of the disease-dynamics 
and consequently suffers from several limitations. Since epidemic outbreaks 
are often novel and disease characteristics are especially unclear at an early 
stage, this research is aimed at designing dynamic, optimal health 
interventions during these events using systems engineering based approaches. 
Online sampling of weekly data from a realistic, calibrated ‘four-community 
agent-based model’ was used to estimate the age-wise vaccine allocation ratios 
using the proposed Non-linear Model Predictive Control scheme. The control 
algorithm used a validated, 15 age-structured compartmental model to 
estimate the number of vaccines to be administered for each age-group for the 
subsequent week in the agent-based model. Meta-analysis from the simulation 
studies has been used to propose robust policies to handle future outbreaks. In 
addition, the list of possible US counties to be targeted for health related 
interventions during future events (modeled using decision trees) is also 
proposed. The following studies have been conducted to establish the future 
directions of this research: (i) a simple household-workplace-school structured 
agent-based model to showcase the effect of information-diffusion during a 
disease outbreak, (ii) a particle-filter based approach for epidemic peak 
prediction using influence-like-illness data, and (iii) geo-spatial mapping of 
epidemic-clusters using surveillance data. The models/resultant tools 
developed during this research can aid public health decision makers to design 
effective health interventions and respond swiftly to an infectious disease 
outbreak. 
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1.1. Infectious disease outbreaks 
Infectious disease outbreaks have occurred frequently throughout history, 
as in 2003, when the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) caused 916 
deaths [1], and even more recently in 2009, with the outbreak of influenza A 
H1N1/09. As per the recent records from the World Health Organization, at 
least 18449 deaths have been officially reported worldwide [2]. Epidemics 
refer to a scenario when a disease occurs in abnormally high proportions 
within a population. Pandemics are epidemics that are not just limited to 
specific locales, but afflict wide expanses of communities/countries, even 
across multiple continents. Epidemic outbreaks of infectious diseases caused 
by novel viral strains are a great cause for concern. These viruses can spread 
quickly from person to person, and in an increasingly connected world, such 
diseases can rapidly spread across countries.  
1.2. Motivation 
Infectious disease outbreaks are a huge burden on health and social 
sectors, causing deaths, and severely impairing society and the economy. 
Hence, it is imperative to carefully manage outbreaks of infectious diseases 
even at an early stage so as to contain their spread and to minimize fatalities. 
There has been substantial development in the pandemic response plans in 
several Asian countries [3], Latin America [4] and Europe [5]. Healthcare 
policy makers across the globe have to make timely decisions on how best to 
use the available public health resources, as and when an outbreak occurs so as 




to minimize social disruption [6]. Infectious disease modeling can aid 
healthcare policy makers to design dynamic, optimal health interventions to 
counter disease outbreaks.  
The 2009 flu pandemic is of special interest to this research. It was caused 
by a novel strain of H1N1 influenza virus [7], with its first identified case on 
April 13, 2009 [8], escalating to being declared a pandemic by the World 
Health Organization [9] in June 2009 [10]. H1N1 pandemic was declared to be 
non-threatening in August 2010 [11] , by which time there were laboratory 
confirmed cases in more than 214 countries, and over 18,000 deaths  [2]. The 
severity of the pandemic, coupled with the modern measures available to 
handle it, led to a coordinated worldwide response. Hence, this pandemic has 
been carefully studied and extremely well-documented, particularly in the 
United States, where healthcare resources are adequate. In addition, 
vaccination efforts were carried out, and these were also studied extensively. 
Therefore, there is a wealth of information available regarding the 2009 flu 
pandemic, making it a prime candidate as a case study for our epidemiological 
research. It is for these reasons that the 2009 flu pandemic in the United States 
has been chosen as a case study to investigate the effects of optimizing 
interventions for the effective control of epidemic. 
Quarantine, public awareness campaigns, antiviral prophylaxis, school 
closures and vaccine allocations are the most commonly used interventions. 
One powerful containment measure is the implementation of mass vaccination 
programs. Vaccines have the effect of enhancing an individual’s immunity to 
specific diseases. Hence, mass vaccination programs are able to protect 
significant numbers of a population from an infectious disease outbreak by 




preventing them from being infected [12]. Unfortunately, vaccines are often in 
short supply during epidemics as was the case in the recent 2009 H1N1 
pandemic. Also, outbreaks are often due to new viral strains for which lengthy 
vaccine research and development timelines hinder mass production of 
vaccines [13]. Hence, health authorities implementing mass vaccination 
programs have only very limited quantities of vaccines to work with, and have 
an urgent need to optimize how the vaccines are to be allocated. Vaccine 
allocation can immensely affect the eventual outcome of the outbreak 
depending on how the various risk groups in a population are vaccinated. 
Established vaccine allocation practices are not well optimized and are often 
static, focusing on specific risk groups such as the young and the elderly 
throughout the entire duration of outbreaks [14] , when it may be more prudent 
to switch tactics at certain time points for higher disease management efficacy. 
1.3.  Process Systems Engineering (PSE) approaches for 
intervention planning 
Process systems engineering approaches to intervention planning requires 
a representative model for the disease propagation and a robust strategy to 
control the resource allocation. This section would summarize the current 
infectious disease modeling practice and the modeling approach that would be 
used in our research. In addition, the need to exploit predictive control based 
methods for intervention planning and a brief introduction on the control 
theory based approach used will also be presented. 
Modeling and simulation can help to systematically gauge the 
effectiveness of various pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions. 
The recent outbreak of H1N1 has provided the scientific community a sad but 




excellent opportunity to use systems approaches to analyze the effect of 
various interventions deployed during the 2009 outbreak and identify 
interventions (or a combination of interventions) to systematically deal with 
future outbreaks. Currently, the spread of an infectious disease outbreak is 
modeled [15] using three approaches: the equation based approach [16],  the 
micro-simulation approach [15, 17-19] and agent based modeling. The most 
commonly preferred equation based approach [16, 20] uses average parameter 
values for the entire population and does not address the interactions occurring 
at the micro level. The assumption is that the entire population moves and 
interacts in the same manner – this is not realistic. Agent based modeling [21, 
22] can handle the emergence property and our research exploits this 
advantage to develop realistic models and design optimal interventions to 
manage epidemic outbreaks. 
This research is aimed at designing dynamic, optimal health interventions 
during infectious disease outbreaks using systems engineering based 
approaches. Optimization of health interventions are typically performed via 
simulations of disease outbreaks in a virtual population. The optimized 
interventions from simulations, however, have historically been predicated on 
possessing a completely known picture of disease characteristics. However, in 
reality, the design of interventions is heavily complicated due to the lack of 
information regarding both disease characteristics and infection patterns 
within the population, especially during early stages of disease outbreaks 
when low numbers are infected (because little useful information can be 
discerned from small data sets). In addition, both disease characteristics and 
infection patterns within the population are very likely to shift over the course 




of the epidemic, by effects such as quarantine measures introduced in response 
to the epidemic outbreak. Such measures make contact rates to fall [23]. These 
would severely impact the usefulness of optimal health interventions that 
assume a deterministic and fixed disease dynamics. Hence 
techniques/approaches that constantly revise the status of disease outbreak 
with real epidemiological data, as and when such data are released by health 
authorities, are needed. This can enhance the accuracy of the system model 
and lead to better optimization of health interventions, as the outbreak 
progresses.  
Process control theory/techniques offer a promising avenue to address 
such resource allocation problems. These techniques have been extensively 
used in the development of improved engineering systems for controlling 
processes to perform as required in the face of disturbances, hard and soft 
constraints on the variables etc. Among the process control techniques, Model 
Predictive Control (MPC) is well-suited for this study because of its ability to 
perform online calculations of the optimal input trajectories for a problem that 
has specific dynamics, objectives and constraints. However, it has to be noted 
that epidemic modeling involves highly nonlinear systems for which linear 
MPC is constrained by severe performance limitations due to the limited 
validity of the linear model to this application [24]. Nonlinear model 
predictive control (NMPC) ideologies can be extended to epidemiological 
studies for predicting how the epidemic will progress in the future and 
optimally adjusting the vaccine allocation accordingly to minimize epidemic 
mortalities.  




1.4.  Objectives 
The main objective of this research was to design dynamic, optimal, robust 
health interventions to handle future outbreaks using systems engineering 
based approaches. This objective was accomplished by the following sub-
objectives: 
 To develop a 15 age-structured compartmental epidemiological model 
which can  simulate an epidemic spread among the US population, and 
calibrate the model for H1N1/09 scenario (Chapter 3) 
 To develop a Non-linear Model Predictive Control algorithm that uses 
the validated compartmental model to estimate the number of vaccines 
to be administered for each age-group for the next planning horizon 
(Chapter 4) 
 To develop a realistic ‘four-community agent-based model’ that can 
simulate an epidemic spread among a scaled-down version of the US 
population, and calibrate the model for H1N1/09 scenario (Chapter 5, 
section 5.1) 
 To estimate the age-wise vaccine allocation profile for various in-silico 
epidemics simulated in the ‘four-community agent-based model’ using 
the NMPC scheme (Chapter 5, section 5.2) 
 To propose robust health interventions to handle future outbreaks 
based on meta-analysis from simulation studies (Chapter 5) 
 To locate possible US counties to be targeted for health related 
interventions during future outbreaks (Chapter 6) 
In addition, the following preliminary studies were conducted to explore 
the possible future research directions: (i) Development of a simple 




household-workplace-school structured agent-based model to showcase the 
effect of information-diffusion during a disease outbreak, (ii) A particle-filter 
based approach for epidemic peak prediction using influence-like-illness data, 
and (iii) Geo-spatial mapping of epidemic-clusters using surveillance data.  
After this introductory chapter (Chapter 1), an overview of the related 
literature will be provided in Chapter 2. Conclusions of the research and 
recommendations for future work will be presented in Chapter 7. A pictorial 
representation of the reminder of the thesis is given in Figure 1.1. 
 











2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Lessons learnt from past disease outbreaks can be useful in strategizing 
interventions which can effectively counter future outbreaks. However, the 
learning from these outbreaks are confined only to intervention strategies 
implemented during the respective outbreaks and thus, limits our 
understanding of intervention planning for future events. Modeling and 
simulation can help to systematically gauge the effectiveness of various 
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The recent outbreak of 
H1N1 has provided the scientific community a significant opportunity to use 
systems approaches to analyze the effect of various interventions deployed 
during the 2009 outbreak and identify interventions (or a combination of 
interventions) to systematically deal with future outbreaks. A brief overview 
on the historical outbreaks is provided in section 2.1. Several modeling 
paradigms have been used in the literature to model disease outbreaks; Section 
2.2 of this chapter will present an overview of the most commonly used 
modeling approaches. The interventions deployed by policy makers during 
infectious disease outbreaks are discussed in section 2.3. The need to include a 
social determinants perspective in intervention planning and hence, the urge to 
develop decision support frameworks that incorporate the socio-structural 
heterogeneity is discussed in section 2.4. The review on model predictive 
control based practices is covered in section 2.5.  




2.1. Infectious Disease Outbreaks 
Infectious diseases, also termed as contagious diseases [25], are those 
which can easily spread from an infected person to others through physical 
contact or through body secretions. Epidemics refer to such outbreaks 
occurring in abnormally high proportions within a population. Pandemics are 
epidemics that are not just limited to specific locales, but afflict wide expanses 
of communities, across countries, worldwide. Infectious disease outbreaks 
have occurred frequently throughout history. Some of the more well-known 
cases include the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, which reportedly caused 50 
million deaths, the 1957 Asian Flu Pandemic with 1.5 to 2 million deaths and 
the 1968 Hong Kong Flu pandemic with 1 million deaths [26]. In the recent 
times, the last decade witnessed the outbreak of the 2003 severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic [1] with 916 deaths and the 2009 
swine flu pandemic with over 18,000 deaths [2]. 
2.2.  Modeling of Infectious Disease Outbreaks 
Quantitative study of human diseases and the associated deaths were first 
discussed by John Graunt in his book, Natural and Political Observations 
made upon the Bills of Mortality in 1662 [27]. This was the first attempt
1
 
which used a systematic method to analyze the various causes of deaths and 
estimate the comparative risks of mortality.  
A century later (about 1766), Daniel Bernoulli conceptualized a more 
theoretical approach to study smallpox, an infectious disease which was 
prevalent then. He observed that a fraction of infected individuals died, while 
                                                 
1 John Graunt’s work is considered to be the first approach to the Theory of Competing Risks. 




the rest acquired immunity to the disease. His efforts were dedicated to 
demonstrate the effect of vaccinating a susceptible person with live virus 
(obtained from a person with a mild case of smallpox). Bernoulli proposed a 
simple mathematical model
2
, which assumed that susceptible people, on 
getting infected, either died immediately or recovered immediately and 
became immune to the disease. Hence, Bernoulli’s model had two states, 
Susceptible and Immune. The changes in the Susceptible population, x(t), and 
the Immune population, z(t), were described by the following rate equations: 
                  ̇( )    ( ( )    ) ( )                                                           (2.1) 
  ̇( )     ( ) ( )   (   )  ( )                                                (2.2) 
where  µ = general death rate per capita 
 β = constant infection rate per individual per unit time 
 α = fraction of infection cases which resulted in death 
The spread of an infectious disease outbreak through a population can be 
modeled using the Law of Mass Action. The Law of Mass Action originates 
from chemistry, and is postulated by Gulberg and Waage [28]. It states that 
“for a homogeneous system, the rate of a chemical reaction is proportional to 
the active masses of the reacting substances”. Law of Mass Action can be 
applied in the epidemiological context that “if the individuals in a population 
mix homogeneously, the rate of interaction between two different subsets of 
the population is proportional to the product of the numbers in each of the 
subsets concerned”. Hence, a population, infected by an epidemic, can be 
modeled with this principle by dividing the population into subsets of those 
infected with the disease, and those who have not yet been infected. The first 
                                                 
2 Bernoulli’s model is regarded as the first account of mathematical modeling of spread of 
disease. 




group shall be termed the ‘Infectious’, and the second group, the ‘Susceptible’. 
The Law of Mass Action is only appropriate for populations with 
homogeneous mixing, which means that all individuals are equally likely to 
interact with each other in a given interval of time. 
An epidemic in the context of this research assumes the emergence of a 
novel strain of an infective agent. Hence, in a closed system (without any 
inflow/outflow of individuals), an epidemic can be initiated by infecting any 
one individual at random. This individual would be the first person to be 
infected by the novel strain, and will then go on to infect others, initiating the 
epidemic within the population. The product of the number of individuals in 
the infectious and the susceptible groups increase as long as the number of 
individuals in the infectious group continues to increase considerably, while 
the number of people in the susceptible group has yet to decrease to the point 
where the decrement is significant. Hence, by the Law of Mass Action, this 
phase of the epidemic involves rapid rates of infections as long as the product 
of the number of individuals in the infectious and the susceptible groups 
remains high. This division of the population into different groups according 
to their disease states for modeling epidemic outbreaks is called 
compartmentalizing. The resulting epidemic models, which are termed as 
compartmental models, are popular tools in epidemiology for modeling 
epidemics. 
In addition, according to the Law of Mass Action, “in any population, it is 
possible for several processes to occur concurrently, in which case the effects 
on the numbers in any given subset of the population from these various 
processes are assumed to be additive”. This suggests that two or more 




processes can act concurrently on individuals in any one compartment. Thus, 
the Law of Mass Action allows for the consideration of additional population 
processes relevant to the flow of individuals between compartments during an 
epidemic, such as death or recovery from an infectious state. With these 
additional processes added into compartmental models, much more detailed 
modeling, specific to the characteristics of different diseases, can be carried 
out. The next section will present the different types of models used in the 
literature – deterministic, stochastic and agent based models.  
2.2.1 Deterministic Models  
2.2.1 (a) Susceptible Infected Recovered (SIR) Model 
For an infectious disease outbreak of a novel strain, it can be assumed that 
when infectious individuals recover, they acquire immunity from being 
infected again. This, in-turn, necessitates a third compartment namely, 
recovered (R), (in addition to the above mentioned Susceptible (S) and 
Infectious (I) compartments) to represent recovered individuals who will 
effectively not be infected again. This basic compartmental epidemiological 
model is termed the SIR model, developed by Kermack and McKendrick in 
1927 [29]. The movement of individuals in the population through the three 
compartments of S, I, and R, as follows:  
             S  I  R                                                                                        (2.3) 
The movement of individuals through the compartments can be explained 
by the following differential equations: 
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                                                                                                (2.6) 
Individuals in the susceptible state contacting infectious individuals are 
infected by them at the rate β, consequently moving from the S compartment 
to the I compartment, at the rate βSiIi. They then recover from the disease at 
the rate γ, moving from the I compartment to the R compartment at the rate of 
γIi. Here, the suffix ‘i’ refers to the age-structuring, dividing the population 
based on the age groups, of the deterministic model.  
2.2.1 (b)  Extended SIR Models 
The SIR model has been much expanded upon for specific applications to 
different disease outbreaks. Extended SIR models are developed commonly by 
including a Death (D) compartment for infectious individuals that fail to 
recover and succumb to the disease. Other possible extensions of the model 
includes differentiation among different types of infectious individuals, such 
as those only being mildly infected, and those who are more severely infected. 
In addition, the models available in the literature include compartments like an 
Exposed (E) compartment (to simulate the latency period that the infected 
individual goes through before infectiousness sets in), Hospitalized (H) 
compartment for infectious individuals (with infections severe enough to 
warrant hospital treatment for recovery) etc., The basic framework of the 
compartmental epidemiological model used in this research necessitates at 
least the following compartments as shown in Figure 2.1.  





Figure 2.1  The basic framework of the compartmental epidemiological model 
used in this research 
At this juncture, efforts have been made by researchers to use similar, 
extensive compartmental epidemiological models to simulate the spread of the 
2009 flu pandemic. One such model [30] is shown in Figure 2.2. These 
models, as well as other models of similar nature, were extensively 
comprehensive in documenting the many different types of infectious stages 























Figure 2.2 An extensive compartmental epidemiological model 
 
However, due to their complex nature, and extensive data requirement, a 
model that would best serve meta-analysis of intervention studies like 
vaccination was selected from the literature [31], as shown in Figure 2.3. 





Figure 2.3  The compartmental epidemiological model selected for this research 
From the above figure, it is evident that this model is a simple extension of 
the Susceptible Exposed Infected Recovered (SEIR) model (with additional H 
and D compartments). Effectively Vaccinated (V), Ineffectively Vaccinated 
(U) and the Protected (P) compartments have been introduced to reflect 
vaccination considerations. A recent study on social contacts and mixing 
patterns relevant to the spread of infectious diseases, a first of its kind, 
provided us the opportunity to approach this research via a detailed 15 age-
structured compartmental model and parameterize the model with reference to 
H1N1 outbreak. Hence, this model was chosen, and its suitability is 
demonstrated in the realization of the NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation 
strategy, as shown later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 




2.2.1 (c) Other Deterministic Models 
Vector-borne disease models are applicable for diseases such as malaria, 
which is spread by a parasite that spends part of its life-cycle in an 
intermediate host, the Anopheles mosquito. The work of malariologists Ronald 
Ross (1857 – 1932) and George Macdonald (1903 – 1967) was instrumental in 
the development of vector-borne disease models, which tract the disease status 
of both the human and the mosquito population. More recent research by 
Otero [32] handles the human and mosquito population differently. In this 
model, the human population is modeled using an Individual-Based Model, 
while the mosquito population is modeled using compartmental models. 
Individual-Based Modeling is also known as Agent-based Modeling, which is 
described in further detail in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.2. Stochastic Models 
The spread of an infectious disease is a random process. Hence, efforts 
have been dedicated to develop stochastic models in the literature. This section 
will present a brief overview on the commonly used stochastic models. 
2.2.2 (a) Chain binomial model 
According to Daley [27], the most commonly used stochastic model is the 
chain binomial model of Reed and Frost (1928), which was never published. 
This model assumes a group of St susceptible and It infectious at times t = 
0,1,2,..., where the time unit is the average length of the serial interval. If there 
is “adequate” contact of an infectious individual with a susceptible, the 
infection is passed on in a relatively short time interval (t, t + ϵ) at the 
beginning of the period. Newly infected individuals It+1 become infectious in (t 




+1, t + 1+ ϵ), and the current infectious It are removed. It is assumed that each 
susceptible has the same probability, 0 < q < 1, of not making adequate 
contact with any given infectious individual, or q
It
 of not making contact with 
any of the It infectious individual during (t, t + ϵ). As a result, the probability 
of infection for each susceptible will be 1 — qIt. The probability of an 







) (     )  (     )                                                     (2.7)                                                                  
which is the product of a chain of binomials, thus the model is referred to the 
chain binomial model. 
2.2.2 (b) General stochastic epidemic model 
A SIR stochastic model for a homogeneous population can be developed 
analogous to the deterministic SIR model. Similar to the Kermack-
McKendrick theorem for the deterministic models, the Whittle’s threshold 
theorem for the general stochastic epidemic was developed to estimate the 
probability that at most a certain number of the susceptibles are ultimately 
infected [5]. The stochastic nature of the modeling process is captured by 
using the agent-based modeling paradigm (to be discussed below), and hence, 
stochastic modeling aspects are not further investigated. For an in-depth 
analysis on stochastic epidemic modeling, the reader may refer to various 
references on the topic, Bayesian Inference for Stochastic Epidemic Models 
using Markov chain Monte Carlo Methods by Demiris [33]. 
 




2.2.3. Agent-based Models  
Apart from the deterministic and stochastic modeling, an alternative 
modeling paradigm is the Agent-based modeling (ABM). In ABM, the model 
consists of a collection of autonomous decision-making entities, known as 
agents. Every agent in the model independently assesses its own situation and 
makes its own decisions on the basis of a predefined set of rules. Agent-based 
models can exhibit complex behavior patterns not predicted by compartmental 
models. Thus, ABM can provide valuable insights about model dynamics of 
the real-world process being simulated [22]. 
One of the earliest attempts on developing an agent-based model was 
made by Thomas C. Schelling in 1971 [34]. Schelling illustrated that a small 
preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could ultimately lead to 
total segregation of the community. A recent version of Schelling’s 
segregation model was implemented as a Java applet, designed by Raj Singh 
[35]. Due to the computationally-intensive procedures, agent-based modeling 
only became popular in the 1990s with the advent of high-performance 
computers. Agent based approaches are used extensively to understand a wide 
range of biological phenomena like the immune system [36] and the spread of 
infectious diseases across social networks [17, 37].  
ABM has the following advantages over other modeling techniques [22]: 
1. ABM can capture the emergent phenomena which results from the 
interaction of individual agents. The emergent phenomenon can have 
properties which are decoupled from the properties of its constituent 
parts. 




2. ABM provides a natural description of the system it models, 
especially for behavioral entities. ABM allows the modeling of 
activities of every agent, instead of averaging the activities into an 
aggregated data. Complex individual behavior can be modeled without 
resorting to complex differential equations.  Stochasticity can be 
applied to agents’ behavior, instead of the conventional practice of 
introducing noise into the differential equations. 
3. ABM is considered to be more flexible, as the complexity of the 
individual agents’, such as behavior, ability to learn and evolve can be 
modified. 
An extensive comparison between differential equation (DEs) models and 
agent-based (AB) models, in the context of infectious disease transmission, 
has been provided by Rahmandad [20]. The dynamics of AB models was 
compared with the corresponding mean-field DE models using a standard 
SEIR model. The most commonly preferred equation based approach [16, 20] 
uses average parameter values for the entire population and does not address 
the interactions occurring at the micro level and assumes that the entire 
population moves and interacts in the same manner, which is not realistic. 
Agent based modeling [21, 22] can handle the emergence property and our 
research exploits this advantage to develop realistic models and design optimal 
interventions to manage epidemic outbreaks. 
2.3.  Intervention Strategies 
Several intervention strategies are available to healthcare policy makers to 
combat an infectious disease outbreak. These strategies can be broadly 




classified as pharmaceutical interventions and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions. 
2.3.1. Pharmaceutical interventions 
Pharmaceutical interventions include the use of vaccines and medicinal 
drugs which reduce the severity of the disease and/or improve the rate of 
recovery from the disease. Vaccination is one of the most effective 
interventions available against infectious diseases, and is estimated to have 
prevented as many as 5 million deaths from smallpox [38]. Vaccinations can 
confer immunity to susceptible individuals and can reduce the transmission of 
the disease once herd immunity develops [12]. Vaccination is the most 
commonly preferred intervention measure to deal with seasonal influenza 
outbreaks, as the strategy is generally safe, are cost effective and offer 
immunity [39]. World Health Organization recommends the following 
influenza-specific antivirals, Oseltamivir (trade name Tamiflu), Zanamivir, 
Amantadine and Rimantadine for influenza epidemics. These drugs are 
effective in reducing the infection by about 1 to 2 days, and are about 70 to 
90% effective at prophylaxis of the susceptibles.  
2.3.2. Non-pharmaceutical interventions 
Although pharmaceutical interventions may be effective in containing an 
infectious disease outbreak, limited resources may constrain our efforts in 
fighting the epidemic [30, 40]. Hence, non-pharmaceutical interventions are 
put in place to complement pharmaceutical interventions [41].  
School closure is one of the most preferred control measures that can work 
in the absence of (or along with) pharmaceutical interventions [42, 43]. It is 




one among the several epidemic control measures that is based on the concept 
of social distancing. The intent here is to lower the contact rates among 
individuals so as to minimize the disease spread that occurs by contact. What 
school closures entails is that between students and staff stop going to school, 
a site where long durations of contact with large proportions of individuals, 
especially students, occurs. This strategy is particularly effective given that 
school-going children between the ages of 6 to 19 years old have the highest 
contact rates among populations, according to contact pattern studies 
conducted in eight European countries [44]. The high contact rates are mainly 
due to their interactions at school with students of their age-group. This is 
evident from the highly assortative mixing trend observed in the contact 
matrix from literature studies. School closures are hence a highly effective 
way to implement social distancing by reducing the contact rates of 
individuals that are responsible for the largest amounts of contacts, and hence, 
likely to be responsible for the most disease transmission events.  
Border screening is another possible measure that can be used to control 
epidemics. Screening stations are set up at the borders of a country or a region 
to detect if any individuals crossing the border are infected. Infected travelers 
are a major source of introductions of disease into a region and hence, this 
control measure would likely slow down the speed at which the disease 
spreads geographically into that particular region.  
Quarantine is a social distancing measure that specifically targets infectious 
individuals and attempts to limit their contacts down to those living with them.  
Contact tracing is a control measure in which the individuals who have 
possibly come in contact with an infected individual are traced and monitored 




to ascertain if they have also been infected. The advantage of contact tracing is 
that if any of the monitored individuals are indeed infected, they are identified 
and sent for treatment immediately. 
2.4.  Why a social determinants perspective? 
Mathematical modeling can help to systematically gauge the effectiveness 
of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions [45]. However, 
intervention studies using decision support frameworks, available in the 
literature, often ignore the effect of socio-structural determinants on the spread 
of infectious diseases. Evidence from the literature suggests that the spread of 
infectious disease is influenced by the social and structural heterogeneity that 
exist both within communities and between countries. The environment and its 
associated factors in which people reside are as important for infectious 
diseases as they are for non-infectious diseases [46, 47]. Infectious diseases 
are essentially 'eco-bio-social' events influenced by ecological, biological and 
social factors [48]. Social determinants strongly influence both the onset and 
response to treatment of major infectious diseases [49]. Hence, a social 
determinant perspective is essential. 
Traditionally, studies on infectious diseases have focused, largely, on 
biological risk factors at the level of the individual. However, social scientists 
emphasize the need to incorporate the socio-economic determinants like 
poverty, education and income in epidemiological studies. A classic example 
is the most often cited 1848 typhus epidemic in Upper Silesia. The German 
physician Rudolf Virchow, the chief investigator of the epidemic, cited factors 
like poverty, hunger, lack of education, and political oppression liable for the 
epidemic episode [50]. 




Studies in the literature have shown the effect of socioeconomic status on 
the disease incidence during the 1918 influenza pandemic [51, 52] and county-
level socio-demographic and economic factors associated with the incidence 
of enteric diseases [53]. Excess mortality data from 27 countries during the 
1918-1920 pandemic was correlated with per-head income and absolute values 
of latitude, generating two regression models. The primary use of the model 
was to serve as a predictive tool for the estimation of global pandemic 
mortality, if a pandemic were to strike later. The reported low R
2
 values 
reported indicate a high possibility that these models may possess 
unsatisfactory predictive capabilities. In addition, pandemic mortality rates 
may also be related to predictor variables other than per-head income and 
absolute latitude.  
Epidemiology involves the understanding of factors affecting the health of 
populations and serves as the basis for interventions made in the interest of 
public health. Thus, an important challenge for optimal intervention planning 
is to understand the relationship between socio-demographic features of the 
community and its subsequent impact on the geo-spatial variation in health 
outcomes. A decision support framework that incorporates the socio-structural 
understanding is thus important for the development and precise evaluation of 
public health interventions and policies [54]. These realistic models can then 
be used to design optimal health interventions.  
2.5.  Model Predictive Control 
Intervention planning commonly used during infectious disease outbreaks 
suffer the limitations of being static and being possibly ill-fitted to novel 
disease strains and evolving disease dynamics. Simulation studies on 




optimizing vaccine allocation strategies have conventionally required 
complete disease information to work effectively. However, epidemic 
outbreaks are often novel and disease characteristics are unclear at an early 
stage. Hence techniques/approaches that constantly revise the status of disease 
outbreak with real epidemiological data, uses a model to predict the system 
response and propose optimal input trajectories (like, vaccine allocation) are 
needed. This can lead to better optimization of vaccine allocation policies. 
Process control theory/techniques offer a promising avenue to address such 
resource allocation problems. These techniques have been extensively used in 
the development of improved engineering systems for controlling processes to 
perform as required in the face of hard and soft constraints. Among the 
process control techniques, Model Predictive Control (MPC) is well-suited for 
this study because of its ability to perform online calculations of the optimal 
input trajectories for a problem that has specific dynamics, objectives and 
constraints. The design objective of model predictive control (MPC) is to 
regulate the trajectory of a future manipulated variable, u, in order to optimize 
the future behavior of the plant output y. The inputs are estimated so that a set 
of P predicted outputs reaches the set point optimally. The control measures 
are based on optimizing the objective function.  The key concepts of MPC, as 
illustrated by Wang, are as follows [55]: 
1. Moving horizon window: the time-dependent optimization window 
from ti to ti + Tp, where ti refers to the start of the window and Tp is the 
length of the window. 




2. Prediction horizon: the length of time for which the future is to be 
predicted. The prediction horizon is equal to the length of the moving 
horizon window, Tp. 
3. Control horizon: Number of times the control move is applied. The 
input is kept constant after the M control moves. 
4. Receding horizon control: while the optimal trajectory of future control 
is determined for the entire moving horizon window, only the first 
sample of the control signal is actually input to the plant control. 
5. Model: the plant model which describes the dynamics of the system.  
6. Cost function: the objective function to be minimized, which is related 
to an error function based on the difference between the desired and 
actual plant responses. 
Epidemic modeling can be considered as a batch process with a finite end 
point optimization, when the disease has been eradicated. MPC ideologies can 
be extended to epidemiological studies for predicting how the epidemic will 
progress in the future and adjusting the vaccine allocation accordingly to seek 
the optimal solution to a set cost function. Based on a pre-defined cost 
function, these techniques can be used to sustain a certain aspect of the 
epidemic as close to set values as possible, such as minimizing the number of 
deaths due to the epidemic, by optimally controlling how vaccines are 
allocated among the different population subgroups. However, it has to be 
noted that such epidemic modeling involves highly nonlinear systems for 
which linear MPC is constrained by severe performance limitations due to the 
limited validity of the linear model to this application [24].  Linear models are 
inadequate for describing the process dynamics of disease outbreaks, requiring 




the application of nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC) for dealing with 
this issue. NMPC ideologies can be extended to epidemiological studies for 
predicting how the epidemic will progress in the future and optimally 
adjusting the vaccine allocation accordingly to minimize epidemic mortalities. 
Through its receding horizon implementation strategy using model based 
predictions, NMPC is able to provide a practical and optimal vaccine 
allocation strategy. Biological applications of MPC and NMPC concepts are 
limited to control in diabetic/AIDS treatment at the patient level [58-60]. In 
addition, MPC algorithms have been deployed in the design and 
implementation of adaptive behavioral interventions [61]. Hence, nonlinear 
MPC (NPMC) approaches for epidemic intervention planning are justified and 
worth investigating.  
2.6.  Summary 
A majority of the current research in intervention planning assumes 
complete knowledge of the disease-dynamics and consequently suffers the 
limitations of being static and being possibly ill-fitted to novel disease strains 
and evolving disease dynamics. In addition, intervention studies often ignore 
the effect of socio-structural determinants on the spread of infectious diseases. 
Hence, a realistic model that incorporates the socio-structural understanding 
and techniques that constantly revise the decision making depending on the 
latest state of the system are needed. The research efforts for this thesis are 
dedicated towards addressing this need. 
The main contributions of this thesis are in addressing the following three 
issues: (i) to develop a realistic agent-based model, (ii) to develop a non-linear 
model predictive control algorithm to estimate the vaccine allocation profile 




for a given epidemic scenario, and (iii) to model healthcare heterogeneity 
among communities. Chapter 3 will focus on modeling a 15 age-structured 
compartmental model to simulate an epidemic spread among the US 
population. Chapter 4 will present a NMPC algorithm for the adaptive on-line 
optimization of vaccine allocation strategies in order to achieve the objective 
of minimal influenza-related deaths. Online sampling of weekly data from a 
calibrated ‘four-community agent-based model’ will be used to estimate the 
age-wise vaccine allocation ratios using the proposed NMPC scheme in 
Chapter 5. In addition, meta-analysis from the simulation studies has been 
used to propose robust policies to handle future outbreaks in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 will use decision tree based models to provide a list of possible US 













3. MODELING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
OUTBREAK 
 
In this chapter, an age-structured compartmental epidemiological model 
that we have developed to simulate an epidemic spread among the US 
population will be presented. In addition, the following aspects will be 
covered: 
 Calibration of the 15 age-structured model to H1N1 2009 pandemic 
 Validation of the model using H1N1 2009 pandemic data from Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), US 
 A series of hypothetical simulations of a H1N1 pandemic outbreak 
among the US population to illustrate the effectiveness of various 
adaptive strategies proposed in the literature 
An age-structured compartmental epidemiological model was developed to 
simulate an epidemic spread among the US population. The population was 
split into fifteen distinct groups of individuals, based on their age. Age-
specific risk factors relevant to the spread (such as contact patterns), morbidity 
and mortality of pandemic influenza, age-specific probabilities of 
hospitalizations and subsequent deaths and efficacies of vaccination were 
based on studies of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak and other relevant 
influenza outbreaks. Such age-wise stratification improved the 
characterization of differing levels of risk to pandemic influenza and hence 
better represented the impacts of an age-wise selective vaccine allocation 
strategy.  




3.1. Compartmental Epidemiological Model 
The age-structured compartmental epidemiological model used in this study 
is adapted from literature [31]. It comprises of a set of differential equations 
describing the time-dependent movement of individuals in a population 
through a series of infection and vaccination states. Each age group of the 
population is classified into nine compartments to represent the different 
disease states: Si (susceptible), Vi (effectively vaccinated but not yet 
protected), Ui (ineffectively vaccinated), Pi (protected by vaccination), Ei 
(exposed), Ii (infectious), Hi (hospitalized), Ri (recovered from infection) and 
Di (dead due to infection). An overview of the model is depicted in Figure. 
3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Flow chart of movements among the compartments in the 
epidemiological model 
The epidemic is initiated by one infected teenager from age group three 
(i.e., I3,0=1), and the rest of the population start out as susceptible individuals 
Si. Susceptible individuals in age group i come into contact with infectious and 

































pandemic influenza at the rate of the age-specific force of infection λi given by 
   ∑    
     
 ( )
  
   , where βij is the transmission rate of pandemic influenza 
between age groups i and j, and N(t) is the total population given by  ( )  
∑   ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )    ( )
  
   . The 
transmission rate βij is a product of q, the probability of transmission per 
contact with infectious or hospitalized individuals, and cij, the age-specific rate 
that an individual in age group i contacts an individual in age group j. 
Individuals exposed to the influenza move to the exposed compartment Ei 
at the rate of the age-specific force of infection λi, these individuals stay 
latently infected for some time before becoming infectious, moving them to 
the infectious compartment Ii at the rate k. An infectious individual may then 
get well to recover and move to the recovered compartment Ri at the rate γ1. 
Alternatively, the infectious individual has an age-specific probability of pHi of 
needing to be hospitalized, for which, he/she moves to the hospitalized 
compartment Hi at the age-specific rate of    
   
     
  . Individuals who are 
hospitalized may manage to recover and move to the recovered compartment 
Ri at the rate γ2, or, alternatively, have an age-specific probability CFPi of not 
recovering and succumbing to the disease, moving to the death compartment 
Di at the age-specific rate of    
    
      
  . 
The compartments of Vi (effectively vaccinated but not yet protected), Ui 
(ineffectively vaccinated) and Pi (protected by vaccination) particularly apply 
to individuals who have been vaccinated against the particular strain of 
influenza. These three compartments will significantly affect the success of 
the mass vaccination program. Vaccination will be applied to individuals in 




the susceptible compartment and will have varying effects. Vaccinated 
individuals have an age-specific probability εi of being effectively vaccinated 
(Ui) at the vaccination rate v(t). However, they are not yet protected from 
infection until the effects of the vaccine are triggered within their bodies, and 
they therefore remain susceptible to infection until they move to the protected 
compartment Pi at the rate η. Once protected, like those in the recovered 
compartment, it is assumed that there is no further risk of infection to them. 
There is also an age-specific probability (1-εi) for susceptible individuals to 
get ineffectively vaccinated at the vaccination rate v(t) whereby the 
vaccination will not protect them from getting infected. 
The age-structured compartmental epidemiological model as described 
above can be incorporated into the following system of differential equations:  
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3.2. Model Parameterization and Calibration 
Population and epidemiological parameters used in the calibration of the 
model are given in Table 3.1. Population details for the model was sourced 
from the U.S. 2010 census [62]. Age-specific contact rates among individuals 
in the virtual population were sourced from a study of contact patterns in eight 
European countries as shown in Figure 3.2 [63]. Age-specific hospitalization 
and case fatality rates for hospitalized cases were based on a Bayesian analysis 
study of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza in the United States [64]. Vaccinated 
individuals are assumed to develop protection after 10 days of vaccination 
[31]. During these 10 days, it is assumed that the individuals remain 
susceptible. Vaccine efficacy is assumed to be 77.5% for individuals under 65 
years old and 35% for individuals over 65 years old, based on various 
influenza vaccine immunogenicity studies [65-68]
.
 Rate of progression from 
exposed to infectious compartments are taken to be 1/1.9, based on influenza 
antiviral studies [69]. Recovery rates for infectious and hospitalized 






Figure 3.2 Age-Specific Contact Matrix 
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3.2.1. Basic Reproduction Number Calibration 
The probability of transmission given contact was tuned to result in a basic 
reproduction number (R0) calculated using standard methods based on various 
epidemiological analyses of the pandemic spread of influenza A (H1N1) in the 
literature [9]. The basic reproduction number refers to the number of cases one 
case generates on average over the course of its infectious period. R0 can be 
obtained with the next-generation operator method
 
[31, 74, 75] , i.e.    
 (    ) for R0 to be expressed as the spectral radius of the next generation 
matrix FW
−1
. For this influenza transmission model, 
  (
        
                  
)                   (3.10) 
  (
                   
                
          
)                  (3.11) 
with  (   )        for           . 




where    
  
 
, the age distribution of the initial susceptible population 
where ∑     
  
   , 
and where for           ,    , 
  (   )          (   )                        (3.12) 
  (   )        (   )                                                   (3.13) 
  (   )          (   )                                                         (3.14) 
Therefore, the next generation matrix is given by 
     (   )                               (3.15) 
with         [(
 
     
) (  
  
     
)]             
3.2.2. Calibration of q (Probability of Transmission per Contact) 
Statistics of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak released by the CDC [76] 
were used for the calibration of q, the probability of transmission of influenza 
through every contact with infectious individuals. This data includes the 
estimated hospitalizations and deaths due to H1N1 infection. These 
corresponded to epidemiological data for the period up to October 17, 2009, 
and so were taken to be representative of the impact of other interventions on 
H1N1, before the vaccination programs were initiated. Using these reported 
data, the value for q was calibrated such that for the period before vaccination 
was initiated (the first 182 days between the first identified case on April 13, 
2009 [8], and the first account of vaccine distribution on October 14, 2009) 
[77], the H1N1 deaths predicted by the model was comparable to that of the 
deaths reported by CDC, while the H1N1 hospitalizations predicted were 
within the bounds of the confidence interval, as shown in Table 3.2. The 
resultant R0 value evaluated from this calibration was 1.47. 




Table 3.2 Predicted pre-vaccination hospitalization and death rates 
 Predicted Reported (95% CI) 
H1N1 Deaths 3887 3893 (2499 - 6120) 
H1N1 Hospitalizations 133505 97536 (62618 - 153327) 
3.2.3. Vaccine Availability 
Vaccination programs only start some weeks into the outbreaks due to 
constraints such as time needed to develop, produce and/or import vaccines 
[13], and also, time needed to observe the progress of the outbreak for a 
decision to be made on whether a vaccination program is necessary. 
Intervention studies to strategize optimal vaccination policy initiate 
vaccination starting 1, 20, 40, 60, 80, or 90 days after the beginning of 
transmission [78]. In this work, it is assumed that the vaccines were available 
in 60 days and vaccination was initiated on day 62 (2 additional days were 
included to account for supply chain logistics). The supply of vaccines, as 
shown in Figure 3.3 was assumed to match records of H1N1 vaccine shipment 
in the U.S. released by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
(CDC) for the entire period of October 14, 2009 to January 27, 2010. Within 
this 105-day period, vaccination supply was fitted to a cubic function with a 
high R² value of 0.998. Thereafter, the CDC ceased releasing vaccine supply 
records, due to sufficiently ample supplies of H1N1 vaccine. Hence, following 
this period, a constant vaccine supply was assumed.  





Figure 3.3 Vaccine availability modeled to match records of H1N1 vaccine 
shipment in the U.S 
3.3. Results 
A series of hypothetical simulations of a H1N1 pandemic outbreak 
among the US population were carried out, to evaluate the performance of 
adaptive vaccination schemes proposed in the literature. A baseline scenario, 
in which no vaccination was applied over the entire course of the pandemic, 
was additionally run as a control.  
3.3.1. Baseline Scenario 
Figure 3.4 shows the dynamics of a simulated outbreak in a baseline 
scenario where no vaccination is applied, and R0 is set to 1.6. Each line 
represents an age group. The H1N1 deaths and hospitalizations reach their 
maximums near day 200, and the pandemic is over by day 250 when the 
number of hospitalizations and deaths plateau (no new hospitalizations or 
deaths). Table 3.3 provides a breakup of the distribution of deaths in this 
baseline scenario.  





Figure 3.4 Progress of death and hospitalization cases over the pandemic 
period for baseline scenario with R0 = 1.6 
 
Table 3.3Age-specific breakdown of deaths for baseline scenario with R0 = 1.6 
Age Group 
(years)








0.0694 0.0671 0.0651 0.0702 0.0702 0.0706 0.0648 0.0669
Number of 
deaths
2830 1611 17979 18884 7201 1450 19088 19482
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0169 0.0096 0.1076 0.1130 0.0431 0.0087 0.1142 0.1165
Age Group 
(years)








0.0684 0.0744 0.0709 0.0618 0.0515 0.0384 0.0905
Number of 
deaths
15713 2437 1470 18770 19816 10654 9779
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0940 0.0146 0.0088 0.1123 0.1185 0.0637 0.0585
 
From Table 3.3, it is evident that several age groups are overrepresented, 
including notably, children between 10 and 19 years of age, as well as young 
adults between 30 and 44 years old, and aged individuals from 55 to 64 years 
old. This proportion is consistent with the age-specific mortality trend for 
pandemic H1N1 2009 outbreak reported by CDC, US [79].  







































































































3.3.2. Comparison Study among Different Hypothetical Adaptive 
Vaccination Strategies 
A series of hypothetical simulations were carried out, to evaluate the 
performance of adaptive vaccination schemes proposed in the literature. The 
details of the adaptive vaccination schemes used for comparison purposes are 
as follows:  
1. The first, labelled ‘AdaptHi’, updated the age-specific vaccination 
ratios to match the last-reported age-specific ratios of individuals 
currently hospitalized due to H1N1 flu infection.  
2. The second, labelled ‘AdaptHc’, updated the age-specific vaccination 
ratios to match the last-reported cumulative age-specific ratios of 
individuals that have been hospitalized due to H1N1 flu infection over 
the course of the pandemic thus far.  
3. The last, labelled ‘AdaptDc’, updated the age-specific vaccination 
ratios to match the last-reported cumulative age-specific ratios of death 
cases for individuals who have succumbed to H1N1 flu infection over 
the course of the pandemic thus far.  
Each set was replicated ten times so as to average out the stochastic effects 
of uncertainty in parameter estimates. Stochasticity was included for the two 
key parameters, in the form of a triangular random distribution, for the fraction 
of clinical cases that are hospitalized (pH) and probability of death following 
hospitalization (CFP, Case Fatality Proportion). The 10 different set of values 
were sampled from the confidence interval of the parameters reported in the 
literature [64]. The performance of these three strategies when used to deal 
with an outbreak with R0 value of 1.6 and with vaccination applied from the 






 day of the outbreak onwards, averaged over ten stochastic runs each, are 
illustrated in Figure 3.5. Error bars indicate ranges of values for each adaptive 
strategy. Number of deaths for the respective adaptive strategy is shown on the 
dotted line.The horizontal dotted line indicates the baseline scenario when no 
vaccination is applied. 
 
Figure 3.5 Comparison study among the three hypothetical adaptive strategies 
From Figure 3.5, it is clear that the three strategies result in numbers of 
deaths and hospitalizations that are statistically similar (within margins of 
error). However, if we look at mean values alone then it can be slightly 
discernible that the Adapt_Hc strategy performs the best, producing the least 
numbers of both deaths and hospitalizations, followed by Adapt_Dc, and 
lastly, Adapt_Hi. Adapt_Hi can easily be expected to perform the worst as it is 
memory-less and does not base its recommendations on useful information 
accumulated over the outbreak, instead relying on instantaneous information. 
Nevertheless, it still manages to perform at a level comparable with the other 
two strategies.  




Between Adapt_Hc and Adapt_Dc, Adapt_Hc seems to be slightly 
superior in performance. This may be because from the state chart (shown in 
Figure 3.1), the trend for deaths can be consistently forecasted in advance by 
tracking hospitalization trends. An optimization strategy that accounts for 
hospitalizations will hence be more effective in preventing individuals from 
entering the hospitalization states, thereby lowering the number of individuals 
entering the strongly correlated death state as well. 
Overall, the three strategies produced comparable performances – all of 
them managed to avert at least two-thirds of the deaths and hospitalizations 
that would have occurred were no vaccinations applied, and hence can be 
considered as reasonably successful. 
 
Figure 3.6 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the three hypothetical adaptive 
strategies 
Figure 3.6 details how the three adaptive schemes allocated the vaccines 
among the different age groups of the population. The similar performance of 
the three strategies is reflected by them using almost identical age-specific 
vaccine allocations right from the early stage of the epidemic, when 




vaccination is most effective and has the most marked effect, well until the 
500
th
 day of the outbreak. 
3.3.2 (a) Comparison Study between Outbreaks of Different R0 Values 
The effects of varying R0 values were investigated and the results, 
averaged over ten stochastic runs each, are illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7 Comparison study between outbreaks of different R0 values 
 
From Figure 3.7, it is evident that the resultant numbers of deaths and 
hospitalizations more than triple, and more than double respectively for R0 
values of 1.6 and 1.8, when compared with R0 = 1.47. These very marked 
increments demonstrate that slight changes in the R0 value can hugely impact 
the severity of outbreaks. The age-specific vaccine allocations for the various 
cases are shown in Figure 3.8, which conveys strong similarities in the vaccine 
allocations regardless of R0 values of the outbreaks. All the cases have almost 
identical vaccine allocations, although the case for R0 = 1.47 has the same 























































to the slower spread of the outbreak that delays the transition of the vaccine 
allocation into successive phases. 
 
Figure 3.8 Age-specific vaccine allocation for outbreaks of various R0 values 
3.3.2 (b) Vaccine Delay Effect 
A study of the vaccine delay effect was conducted to compare the results 
of initiating vaccination on the 62
nd
 day of the outbreak, as compared with 
doing so on the 182
nd
 day, which was the actual case for the United States 
during the 2009 Flu Pandemic. The results, averaged over ten stochastic runs 
each, are illustrated in Figure 3.9. The horizontal dotted line indicates the 
baseline scenario when no vaccination is applied at all. As expected, starting 
vaccinations earlier on the 62
nd
 day averted more deaths and hospitalizations 
than starting vaccinations on the 182
nd
 day. This 120 days of extra delay led to 
an increase in numbers of deaths and hospitalization cases by three orders of 
magnitude. Notably, starting vaccination as late as the 182
nd
 day is highly 
ineffective and does very little to manage the epidemic significantly, averting 
only a very small proportion of the deaths and hospitalizations that would have 
occurred with no vaccination intervention applied at all. Therefore, it is 




imperative that vaccination be applied as quickly as possible in any epidemic 
outbreak, as any delay can greatly increase the number of deaths.  
 
Figure 3.9 Comparison study of the vaccine delay effect 
 
Figure 3.10 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the vaccine delay effect study 
 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter presented a 15 age-structured compartmental epidemiological 
model calibrated for H1N1 2009 pandemic. The effectiveness of various 
adaptive strategies proposed in the literature was studied using the developed 
model. However, these schemes utilize feedback control, wherein the adaptive 













Day 62 vs. Day 182 Vaccine Initialization
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Day 62 vs. Day 182 Vaccine Initialization
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strategies try to match vaccine allocation to hospitalization or death trends that 
have already occurred. However, the vaccine allocation can be substantially 
improved by using predictive control, forecasting the future epidemiological 
trends and optimizing vaccine allocation in preparation for future vaccine 
requirements accordingly. The next chapter will present a nonlinear model 
predictive control (NMPC) scheme for the optimization of vaccine allocation 























4. NON-LINEAR MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL 
BASED INTERVENTION PLANNING 
 
This chapter will present a nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC) 
scheme for the optimization of vaccine allocation strategies, used in mass 
vaccination programs, during infectious disease outbreaks. The compartmental 
epidemiological model developed in Chapter 3 will be used to simulate a 
pandemic spread among a virtual population of US to demonstrate the 
proposed approach. In-silico epidemiological data collected at preset sampling 
intervals are used to estimate the age-wise vaccine allocation ratio so as to 
minimize the number of deaths caused by the influenza outbreak. The optimal 
control action (vaccine allocation) obtained is implemented on the virtual 
population until the next data sampling takes place. The vaccine allocation 
strategy optimized by the NMPC scheme is compared with a reference-
baseline scenario as well as other adaptive vaccine allocation practices 
(discussed in Chapter 3), and the results are presented. 
4.1. NMPC Formulation 
In this research, the vital role of NMPC is to serve as an optimal control 
strategy for minimizing deaths resulting from H1N1 infections by 
implementing an optimized series of vaccine allocation commensurate with 
the changing pandemic situation. The dynamic optimization problem that 
needs to be solved at sampling time    using current process state  ( ) as 
initial conditions can be formulated as, 




   
 ( ) ∫  ( ( )  ( )  ( ))  
     
  
                             (4.1) 
s.t. 
  ( )
  
  ( ( )  ( )  ( ))                   (4.2) 
   ( ( )  ( )  ( ))                   (4.3) 
 ( )   (  )                   (4.4) 
    ( )                       (4.5) 
    ( )                       (4.6) 
    ( )                       (4.7) 
                           (4.8) 
where   is the scalar time dimension,    is the prediction horizon length, 
 ( )      is a vector of dynamic state variables,  ( )      is a vector of 
controlled variables and  ( )      is a vector of manipulated variables.  ( ) 
is the current measured state vector.    and   ,   and   , and   and   are 
lower and upper bounds vectors of dynamic and algebraic states (some states 
are also the measured outputs) and manipulated variables respectively. 
The dynamic age-structured compartmental epidemiological model is 
utilized with  ( ) and  ( ) at    for predictions of future states of the system 
 (    ) over the prediction horizon   . The nonlinear programming problem 
is solved over   [        ] based on equations 4.1 to 4.8. The objective 
function is formulated as:  
    ( ) ∫ (( ( )      )
  ( ( )      )  ( ( )      )
 
 ( ( )  
     
  
    ))                                                                                                      (4.9) 




where      and      are respectively the set-points and reference values for the 
controlled and manipulated variables. Here, it has to be noted that the cost 
function also includes a term related to the manipulated variable (vaccine 
allocation). One would expect the cost function to involve only cumulative 
deaths while penalization of vaccine allocations shall be included only as hard 
constraint in the problem. In general, a penalty term on control actions is 
included in NMPC to avoid aggressive control actions (that may be 
detrimental to actuators). However, this is not applicable for the current 
application where minimization of deaths should be achieved at any cost. 
The symbols   and   represent diagonal weighting matrices. When 
disease information is lacking, it is recommended that vaccination allocation 
studies be based on mortality rather than morbidity [79]. Hence,  ( ) is a 
vector of the age-specific cumulative deaths whereas  ( ) is a vector of age-
specific allocated vaccines. All elements of      are set to 0 while      
corresponds to an initial guess pertaining to the population ratio of the 
individual age groups. The 9
th
 diagonal element in   which corresponds to 
deaths is set to 1 while the diagonal elements in   corresponding to the rest of 
the controlled variables are set to 0, as are each of the diagonal elements in   
with no cost incurred for the variability of vaccine allocation (due to the 
assumption in the transmission model that all vaccines provided are used up, 
with no leftovers). 
At     , the true state  (   ) is obtained and the control action  (   ) 
for optimal vaccine allocation computed over the time horizon   
[          ] is extracted and implemented into the system. Setting       
progresses to the next iteration. In our work, a sampling interval of 7 days was 




implemented for samples of epidemiological data to be taken from the true 
system. This parallels the weekly pandemic influenza updates that various 
health authorities provided during the peak of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, in 
the form of updates on the disease situation and the number of hospitalization 
cases and deaths. Based on the data sampled at each sampling interval, the 
system model makes prediction of the future dynamic states over the set 
prediction horizon. Using these predicted future states, on-line calculations are 
made over a control horizon to determine the optimal vaccine allocation 
among the different age groups for which the performance objective function 
of deaths resulting from H1N1 infection are minimized, within the solution 
space described by the following constraints:  ( ) and  ( ) must be non-
negative and each age-specific compartment cannot exceed the initial age-
specific population. Elements of  ( ) must add up to unity and are constrained 
to values from zero to one (inclusive). In this research, the prediction horizon 
was assumed to be 7 days and within the sampling interval, the control action 
is applied once. The vaccine allocation profile is kept constant for the next 6 
days. 
              is a vector of zeros,                  (4.10) 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations,                 (4.11) 
              is a vector of zeros,                  (4.12) 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations,                 (4.13) 
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                                   .                 (4.16) 




The first part of the optimized vaccine allocation strategy is applied into 
the true system until the next sampling interval, when new sampled data from 
the true system becomes available. This ensures a feedback mechanism that 
accounts for deviations of the true system behavior from the predicted system 
behavior due to process disturbances and mismatch between the true system 
and the system model. The model-reality mismatch was included by 
introducing stochasticity into the two key parameters of the predictive model, 
the fraction of clinical cases that are hospitalized (pH) and probability of death 
following hospitalization (CFP, Case Fatality Proportion). The 10 different set 
of values were sampled from the confidence interval of the parameters 
reported in the literature [64]. Active-set method was used for optimization. 
The details of the NMPC scheme used for intervention planning are 
summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Details of the NMPC scheme used for intervention planning 
System model used by 
NMPC 
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Parameters of the system 
model 
Listed in ‘Table 3.1’ 
NMPC formulation    
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Constraints               is a vector of zeros, 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations, 
              is a vector of zeros, 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations, 
∑     
  
   , 
              is a vector of zeros, 
              is a vector of ones. 
Feedback State observer feedback  
Prediction Horizon 1 Week 
Control Horizon 1 day (for every 1
st day of the epidemiological week, 
the control action is applied once. The vaccine 
allocation profile is kept constant for the next 6 days) 
Weights on Outputs The 9th diagonal element in   which corresponds to 
deaths is set to 1 while the diagonal elements in   
corresponding to the rest of the controlled variables 
are set to 0 
States                             
              
Inputs (multiple-variables)   
   
              
 
4.2.  Results 
A series of empirical simulations of a H1N1 pandemic outbreak among the 
US population were carried out, for the purpose of exploring the range of 
diverse effects that different key factors involved in pandemic spread and 
control have on the effectiveness of NMPC scheme, as applied to the 
optimization of vaccine allocation. In this study, the following factors were 
investigated: 
 Baseline comparison with the NMPC scheme 




 Effect of Basic Reproduction Number, R0 
 Effect of available vaccine stock 
 Effect of promptness of vaccination program initiation 
 Effect of weightings of deaths and/or hospitalizations in the 
objective function 
 Effect of using schemes that are under-sensitive or over-sensitive – 
comparison studies were made to explore how would an NMPC-
based optimization scheme which assumes an R0 of 1.6 deal with a 
true pandemic with an R0 of 1.8, and vice versa. 
4.2.1. Baseline Comparisons with the NMPC Scheme
3
 
Figure 4.1 shows the dynamics of a simulated outbreak in a baseline 
scenario where no vaccination is applied, and R0 is set to 1.6. The H1N1 
deaths and hospitalizations reach their maximums near day 200, and the 
pandemic is over by day 250 when the number of hospitalizations and deaths 
plateau.  
 
Figure 4.1  Progress of death and hospitalization cases over the pandemic period 
for baseline scenario with R0 = 1.6 
                                                 
3 Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 are contents reproduced from section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3.  







































































































Table 4.2 summarizes the distribution of deaths for this baseline scenario. 
Several age groups are over-represented, including notably, children between 
10 and 19 years of age, as well as young adults between 30 and 44 years old, 
and aged individuals from 55 to 64 years old. The term ‘over-represented’ 
here refers to the proportion of deaths of a particular age-group being greater 
than its proportion of initial population. This proportion is consistent with the 
age-specific mortality trend for pandemic H1N1 2009 outbreak [80].  
Table 4.2 Age-specific breakdown of deaths for baseline scenario with R0 = 1.6 
Age Group 
(years)








0.0694 0.0671 0.0651 0.0702 0.0702 0.0706 0.0648 0.0669
Number of 
deaths
2830 1611 17979 18884 7201 1450 19088 19482
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0169 0.0096 0.1076 0.1130 0.0431 0.0087 0.1142 0.1165
Age Group 
(years)








0.0684 0.0744 0.0709 0.0618 0.0515 0.0384 0.0905
Number of 
deaths
15713 2437 1470 18770 19816 10654 9779
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0940 0.0146 0.0088 0.1123 0.1185 0.0637 0.0585
 
Figure 4.2 shows the notably different dynamics of a simulated outbreak 
with the same settings except that vaccination is applied from day 62 onwards, 
with the allocation of vaccines among the fifteen age groups dynamically 
optimized every week by the NMPC scheme. The H1N1 deaths and 
hospitalizations also reach their maximums near day 200, however, the 
pandemic is spread out over a longer period of time and takes till day 400 to 
be over when the number of hospitalizations and deaths plateau. Table 4.3 
breaks down the distribution of deaths in the NMPC-optimized scenario. 





Figure 4.2 Progress of death and hospitalization cases over the pandemic period 
for NMPC scenario with R0 = 1.6 
 












0.0694 0.0671 0.0651 0.0702 0.0702 0.0706 0.0648 0.0669
Number of 
deaths
142 57 57 58 112 167 103 83
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0511 0.0206 0.0204 0.0210 0.0406 0.0604 0.0370 0.0299
Age Group 
(years)








0.0684 0.0744 0.0709 0.0618 0.0515 0.0384 0.0905
Number of 
deaths
75 208 209 139 89 230 1042
Proportion 
of deaths
0.0270 0.0751 0.0754 0.0500 0.0321 0.0830 0.3762
 
Here, only two age groups are over-represented: the older age groups of 
those between ages 65 to 69, and severely so, those above 70 years of age. 
From Figure 4.3, it can be observed that previous over-represented age groups 
in the baseline scenario have been especially targeted by the NMPC scheme 
for vaccination, which significantly lowered the contribution of these 



























































































































































previously main contributors to the total deaths. However, a side effect of this 
optimization strategy was that the previously underrepresented age group of 
individuals above age 70 becomes vastly over-represented because other 
previously over-represented age groups were given emphasis for vaccination. 
Here, it has to be noted that the number of deaths in this worst-performing age 
group still manages to achieve almost 90% decrease from 9779 deaths to 1042 
deaths. Also, the overall deaths have been cut down by a remarkable 98.3% 
from the baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 4.3 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the NMPC scheme at default 
settings with R0 = 1.6 
Beyond day 400, the pandemic is almost over with very low number of 
additional hospitalizations and deaths. As the effectiveness of vaccines fall 
sharply the later they are administered during a pandemic, it may not be 
prudent to continue vaccination at this stage as the few additional infections 
averted by vaccinations here may not be able to justify the resource costs of 
continuing to invest in vaccination. Herd immunity and other associated 




effects may be more than enough to ensure that the pandemic ends without the 
need for further vaccination. By this time-period, the fraction of the population 




 for the elimination of transmission [81]. However, in this research, 
vaccination was continued to study the vaccine allocation patterns of the 
NMPC scheme in the post-pandemic period. From Figure 4.3, it is evident that 
there is a shift in vaccine allocation towards individuals below 19 years of age 
in the post-pandemic period after day 400, followed by a transition to chiefly 
recommend vaccination for elderly above 55 years of age beyond day 600, 
after which there are no more still-susceptible individuals below 19 years of 
age left to vaccinate.  
4.2.2. Effect of Basic Reproduction Number, R0 
At the default settings of initiating vaccination on the 62
nd
 day of the 
outbreak, and using vaccination levels as was reported by CDC, the effect of 
varying the R0 between 1.6 and 1.8 for the simulated pandemic was explored. 
Figure 4.4 shows the relative performances of the various adaptive vaccination 
schemes (discussed in Chapter 3), including the proposed NMPC scheme, 
each averaged over ten runs.  





Figure 4.4 Effect of R0 on the performance of various vaccination schemes 
For R0 = 1.6, the baseline scenario (which applies no vaccination) results in 
an average of 202,451 deaths and 5,891,136 hospitalizations out of the entire 
simulated US population of 307,006,550. Predictably, the case of R0 = 1.8 
presents a worse result of 240,927 deaths and 6,832,290 hospitalizations. The 
three competing adaptive schemes and the NMPC scheme have different 
strategies of dynamically adjusting the vaccine allocation ratio of the same 
vaccine supply throughout the pandemic. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the NMPC 
scheme significantly outperforms each of the other three schemes both in 
terms of averting deaths and hospitalizations. The three adaptive schemes 
(‘AdaptHi’, ‘AdaptHc’ and ‘AdaptDc’) do not differ significantly from one 
another in terms of performance in this evaluation, and are able to only avert 
approximately three-quarters of the deaths and hospitalizations that the NMPC 
scheme has been able to avert for both R0 scenarios investigated. 
When R0 is 1.6, nearly 99% of baseline deaths and hospitalizations can be 
averted, with an average of only 2,698 deaths and 80,870 hospitalizations. 
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This could suggest a near-saturation of averting deaths and hospitalizations in 
the case of R0 = 1.6. Raising R0 to 1.8 markedly decreases the number of 
deaths and hospitalizations that the NMPC scheme is able to avert by 
approximately a quarter to about 74%, with an average of 61,313 deaths and 
1,830,238 hospitalizations. This is a significant reduction from the 99% that 
was observed for the case of R0 = 1.6. As other schemes also exhibit the same 
trends, vaccination strategies are less able to avert baseline deaths and 
hospitalizations for outbreaks characterized by higher values of R0. 
 
Figure 4.5 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the NMPC scheme at default 
settings 
Figure 4.5 shows how the NMPC scheme allocated the vaccines among the 
different age groups of the population to optimally minimize the number of 
deaths over the period of the pandemic that vaccination was available for both 
R0 values. For both values of R0, the allocation trends are highly similar, with 
an early emphasis on vaccinating children between ages 5 to 19, preceding an 
emphasis on young adults of 20 to 44 years old, before focusing on middle-
aged adults between 45 and 49 years of age, followed by those between 50 and 
54 years, and those between 55 and 59 years next. This vaccine allocation 




pattern is compressed into a shorter period of time in the R0 = 1.8 case than 
when R0 = 1.6.  
After this phase, in the case of R0 = 1.8, vaccination is scattered among the 
age extremities of younger and older individuals, suggesting that the effect of 
vaccination on decreasing deaths has become less critical at this stage such 
that a sustained focus on vaccinating one particular age group is not needed. In 
contrast, for the case of R0 = 1.6, the NMPC scheme continues to focus on 
vaccinating young children below 5 years of age for some time before 
similarly scattering the age-specific vaccination focus among the older 
population. This divergence in late-stage vaccine allocation may be attributed 
to the significantly less number of hospitalizations and deaths at this point in 
the pandemic.  
4.2.3. Effect of available vaccine stock 
The effect of varying vaccine stock was investigated by fixing vaccination 
on the 62
nd
 day of the outbreak and setting R0 to be 1.6 in one comparison 
study and 1.8 for the other. The same vaccine supply trend, v(t), as was 
reported by CDC (as shown in Figure 3.3) was implemented. However, here 
the supply was modified by a multiplier to either halve or double the vaccine 
supply. Figure 4.6 shows the effect of varying the vaccine stock on the 
performances of the NMPC scheme in minimizing the number of deaths 
resulting from the pandemic. The effect of varying the vaccine stock on the 
performances of the NMPC scheme in minimizing the number of 
hospitalizations due to the pandemic is shown in Figure 4.7. 
From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, it is evident that varying the amount of 
available vaccine stock available has a very pronounced effect on the 




performance of the NMPC scheme. Halving the vaccine supply compromises 
the efficacy of the NMPC scheme and decreases the extent by which it 
outperforms the three empirical alternative adaptive schemes. At the other 
extreme, doubling the vaccine stock reduces the penalty of inefficiently 
allocating vaccines, providing sufficient vaccine stock to the three alternative 
adaptive schemes for them to perform well enough to approach the superior 
performance of the NMPC scheme. This simulation provides a best case 
scenario that could help policy makers to decide on vaccine supply related 
costs. 
 
Figure 4.6 Effect of vaccine stock on the performance (deaths averted) of various 
vaccination schemes 
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Figure 4.7 Effect of vaccine stock on the performance (hospitalizations averted) 
of various vaccination schemes 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the NMPC scheme for varying 
vaccine stock amounts 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the effect of varying the amount of vaccine stock on 
how the NMPC scheme allocates vaccines among the fifteen age groups 
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across the vaccination period. The early emphasis on children and then young 
adults for vaccination, as mentioned in the previous section, is again evident in 
all cases. However, when the vaccine stock is doubled, the subsequent 
staggered shifts in emphasis on different age groups of middle-aged adults are 
instead relatively compressed into a much smaller period of time. Focus is 
given thereafter to vaccinating young children below 5 years of age, as was 
observed for the original amount of vaccine stock at R0 = 1.6, after which 
additional vaccination emphasis is given to older individuals above 70 years of 
age. This is followed by vaccinating individuals between 60 and 64 years, and 
lastly to individuals between 65 and 69 years old before there are no more 
individuals left in the susceptible compartment left to vaccinate. 
On the other extreme, when the vaccine stock is halved, the early emphasis 
on children and then young adults for vaccination is stretched out over a long 
period of time before transitioning into a scattered allocation of vaccine across 
multiple age groups. Again, this suggests that the effect of vaccination on 
decreasing deaths has become less critical at this stage.  
4.2.4. Effect of promptness of vaccination program initiation 
For investigating the significance of the number of days of starting a 
vaccination program after a pandemic outbreak, the initiation of the 
vaccination program was either shifted ahead to day 32, or delayed till day 92. 
Figure 4.9 shows the resultant effect on the performances of the NMPC 
scheme in minimizing the number of deaths resulting from the pandemic. 
Corresponding results on the number of hospitalizations resulting from the 
pandemic is shown in Figure 4.10. 





Figure 4.9 Effect of vaccination program initiation delay on the performance 
(deaths averted) of various vaccination schemes 
 
Figure 4.10  Effect of vaccination program initiation delay on the performance 
(hospitalizations averted) of various vaccination schemes 
From Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10, it is clear that starting a vaccination 
program earlier improves the performances of all four schemes in averting 
deaths (and hospitalizations). Again, in the case of R0 = 1.8, delaying the start 
of a vaccination program compromises the efficacy of the NMPC scheme and 
decreases the extent by which it outperforms the three empirical alternative 
adaptive schemes. Both low vaccine supplies and late vaccination-initiation 
delay the onset of herd immunity, after which the outbreak is uncontrollable 
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and will recede even without further intervention effects. Therefore, in 
addition to the critical vaccine supply threshold, there is also a critical time 
period during an outbreak before which vaccination should be quickly initiated 
before effectiveness drastically falls. This critical period may be well before 
the peak of an outbreak is reached [82].  
Considering that the peak of this outbreak occurred around Day 200, 
starting vaccinations on Day 92 may already have been too late, and this is 
marked by its considerable reduction in deaths averted as compared to that 
obtained by initiating vaccination on Day 62 for outbreaks with both low and 
high R0 values. For the case of R0 = 1.8, starting vaccination on Day 62 was 
also too late for the vaccination programme to be effective enough to replicate 
the saturation effect observed for the case of R0 = 1.6. Figure 4.11 illustrates 
the effect of varying the starting day of a vaccination program on how the 
NMPC scheme allocates vaccines among the fifteen age groups across the 
vaccination period.  
Interestingly, between outbreaks of the same R0 value, the vaccine 
allocation plots in Figure 4.11 are similar to one another for approximately the 
first 120 days after starting vaccination. From here on, the focus is shifted to 
vaccinate adults between ages 45 to 49. This suggests that no matter when the 
vaccination program is started, the method by which the NMPC scheme 
optimally minimizes the number of deaths involves the same series of vaccine 
allocation steps, especially at the initial stage. Hence, the nuances of variations 
in age-specific vaccine allocations have much less of a part to play in why 
earlier initiations of a vaccination program would result in the higher number 
of deaths and hospitalizations averted. 





Figure 4.11 Age-specific vaccine allocation for the NMPC scheme for 
varying the starting day of a vaccination program 
From Figure 4.11, it is evident that when vaccination is initiated, the 
NMPC scheme recommends immediate emphasis on vaccinating children 
between ages 5 to 19. From the contact matrix shown in Figure 3.2 (in Chapter 
3), it can be seen that this group has higher than average rate of contacts for 
both within their age groups and with others outside of their age group. Hence, 
the recommendation made by the NMPC scheme here is probably to target 
individuals that have high contact rates (children to teenagers in this study) for 
initial phase vaccination to perhaps slow down disease transmission, until 
more deaths occur. The trivial differences in vaccine allocation in Figure 4.11 
during this initial stage are far from adequate to account for the huge 
differences in deaths averted shown in Figure 4.9.  
4.2.5. Effect of Weightings of Deaths and/or Hospitalizations in the 
Objective Function 
The effects of varying the weightings of deaths and/or hospitalizations in 
the objective function for the simulated pandemic was investigated in relation 




to the application of the NMPC-based optimized vaccine allocation strategy. 
Figure 4.12 shows the relative performances of the various resulting 
combinations explored, which have been averaged over ten stochastic runs 
each.  
 
Figure 4.12 Effect of varying the weightings of deaths and/or hospitalizations 
in the objective function 
Among all combinations of weightings in the objective function explored, 
completely basing the NMPC optimization on deaths while neglecting 
hospitalization in the objective function (case 0:1) led to, by far, the greatest 
number of eventual hospitalizations and deaths. This indicates the importance 
of including hospitalizations weightings in the objective function. Here, case 
0:1 refers to weighting the 9
th
 diagonal element in   which corresponds to 
deaths to 1, while the diagonal elements in   corresponding to the rest of the 
controlled variables are set to 0. Similarly, case 1:0 refers to weighting the 7
th
 
diagonal element in   which corresponds to hospitalizations to 1, while the 
diagonal elements in   corresponding to the rest of the controlled variables 
are set to 0. In the epidemiological model, severely infected individuals move 
into the hospitalized state before moving into the death state. The 0:1 case 











































bases its optimization on deaths alone, and hence, can only use data from 
deaths to indirectly affect the number of hospitalizations, which strongly 
correlates with the number of deaths, leading to this strategy performing 
poorly in contrast with the other alternatives. 
However, utilizing the number of hospitalizations only or even in part in 
the objective function produces more favorable results. The results for the 
number of hospitalizations and deaths for the other eight scenarios were all 
significantly less, and hovered around values of 40,000 hospitalizations and 
1,500 deaths respectively. An optimization strategy that accounts for 
hospitalizations will hence be more effective in preventing individuals from 
entering the hospitalization states, thereby lowering the number of individuals 
entering the strongly correlated death state as well. 
The clustering of results for these eight scenarios is significant and 
suggests that comparable good results can possibly be obtained regardless of 
the strategy being used, as long as hospitalization is accounted for in the 
objective function. Out of the eight scenarios, case 1:2 exhibits the best 
performance (if only the mean value of deaths or hospitalizations is 
considered), though as mentioned, its improvement over the next best-
performing strategy is not statistically significant. The age-specific vaccine 
allocations for the various cases are shown in Figure 4.13, which conveys the 
strong similarities in the vaccine allocation recommended by the NMPC-based 
optimization schemes among all the cases. The early emphasis is on 
vaccinating children between ages 5 and 19 before focusing vaccination on 
young adults of 20 to 44 years old is evident from all nine plots. However, the 
0:1 case stands out as somewhat different from the rest, with its more focused 




vaccination of individuals from 45 to 49 years old from approximately day 
200 to day 300. 
 
Figure 4.13 Age-specific vaccine allocation for various weightings of deaths 
and/or hospitalizations in the objective function 
Between day 350 and day 450, the focus is on vaccinating individuals 
from 50 to 54 years old. Also, short bursts of vaccination focuses on those 
from 30 to 34 years of age, 25 to 29 years of age, 55 to 59 years of age, 0 to 4 
years of age, and above 70 years of age, around days 175, 325, 475, 600 and 
675, respectively. These features, inexistent in the other eight scenarios, might 
have made all the difference as to why the 0:1 case led to markedly higher 
number of hospitalizations and deaths as compared to the rest of the cases. 
Conversely, the age-specific vaccination allocations of the other eight 
scenarios are highly similar to one another.  




4.2.6. Effect of Using Schemes that are Under-Sensitive or Over-Sensitive 
In a true disease pandemic, the values of many disease parameters cannot 
be well-established until at a later stage. Therefore, the values of several 
disease parameters used in epidemiological simulations may deviate to some 
extent from the real values. Hence, an empirical analysis is necessary to 
ascertain the outcomes of such deviations in disease parameters. To this end, 
comparison studies were made to explore how would an NMPC-based 
optimization scheme which assumes an R0 of 1.6 deal with a true pandemic 
with an R0 of 1.8 (real18sim16), and vice versa (real16sim18). Figure 4.14 
shows the results of such under-sensitive and over-sensitive schemes, 
averaged over ten stochastic runs each. Also, the correct sensitivity schemes 
are shown for comparison purpose. 
 
Figure 4.14 Effect of using schemes that are over-sensitive or under-sensitive 
The under-sensitive real18sim16 case, as expected, led to increased 
number of hospitalizations and deaths over the accurately calibrated 
real18sim18 case for R0 of 1.8. However, this increase is small and is actually 
within margins of error. As for the over-sensitive real16sim18 case, a decrease 
in number of hospitalizations and deaths actually took place over the 
real16sim16 case for R0 of 1.6, albeit within margins of error. The results 










































illustrate that over-sensitivity may interestingly yield better results than if the 
assumptions of disease parameter values were spot-on. Hence, 
overcompensation of disease parameters may be a useful strategy when 
applying the NMPC-based optimization scheme. 
 
Figure 4.15 Age-specific vaccine allocation for cases of over-sensitive or under-
sensitive schemes 
As for the age-specific vaccine allocations, as depicted in Figure 4.15, the 
allocations for the over-sensitive or under-sensitive schemes are almost similar 
to the cases where the basic reproduction number were assumed accurately. 
Major features of the vaccine allocation heat maps are almost identical. This is 
manifested in the result that number of hospitalizations and deaths are 
impacted only very slightly, still within margins of error. 
4.3.  Discussion 
An age-structured epidemiological model was used to simulate the spread 
of H1N1 pandemic among the US population with mass vaccination programs 




as the intervention measure to manage the disease outbreak. Timely 
intervention efforts involving vaccination programs with sufficient amounts of 
vaccine stocks are potentially able to avert as much as over 99% of 
hospitalizations and deaths, as can be seen from the simulations involving 
either original or double of the original vaccine stock being used from either 
the 32
nd
 day or the 62
nd
 day onwards (as illustrated in section 4.2.3 and section 
4.2.4). However, it is crucial that vaccine allocations be highly optimized for 
vaccination programs to be well utilized. The NMPC scheme, together with all 
three of the empirical adaptive schemes used for comparison purposes, were 
provided with the same amount of vaccine stock for equivalent simulation 
settings. By merely changing vaccine allocations, differences between 
scenarios of as much as seventeen times more deaths and hospitalizations were 
observed. Considering that this research study has only compared between 
four vaccine allocation strategies which were all dynamic, it may be the case 
that were the NMPC scheme to be compared with static vaccine allocation 
strategies that do not adapt themselves to the situation as the pandemic 
situation progresses, the differences may be even greater. Therefore, our work 
shows the great importance of planning vaccine allocations well to make the 
best use of limited vaccine supplies. 
The key difference between the NMPC scheme and the three adaptive 
strategies is that the NMPC scheme actively utilizes predictive control, 
forecasting future epidemiological trends and optimizing vaccine allocation in 
preparation for future vaccine requirements. This important distinction has led 
to the NMPC scheme performing the best out of the four dynamic schemes 
investigated in this work. Through its prediction of future states, the NMPC 




scheme is able to assist strategists with determining how best to change 
vaccine allocation strategies when priorities change, and what allocations 
should be used for more ideal results. In addition, strategists can be alerted of 
recommended changes in advance so as to be able to make preparations for the 
necessary logistics related changes for effective administration of vaccination. 
Furthermore, our results show the large impacts of changing the available 
vaccine supply, and also the promptness with which vaccination programs are 
initiated in response to pandemic outbreaks. In this work, comparison studies 
(section 4.2.4) were made between using the nominal vaccine supply (as was 
reported by CDC to have been used by the US) in the H1N1 outbreak, and 
using half, or double of that amount. Deaths and hospitalizations decreased 
significantly with increasing vaccine stocks used, as can be expected. Of note 
is that the vaccine stock used also affects how well the NMPC scheme fares 
relative to other adaptive schemes. With lower vaccine stocks, the NMPC 
scheme has less vaccine to work with in optimizing the allocation of these 
vaccines, leading to not as much improvements in hospitalizations and deaths 
averted over the other three adaptive schemes. 
Comparison studies between initiating the vaccination program after 
different durations of delay after the onset of the pandemic have also 
highlighted the importance of starting the course of vaccines as soon as 
possible. From our study, it is clearly evident that with every additional delay 
of 30 days, very large increase in the number of hospitalizations and deaths 
were observed (as illustrated in section 4.2.4). Particularly, the NMPC 
scheme’s advantage in hospitalizations and deaths averted over the other three 
adaptive schemes shrinks with increased delays in vaccination program 




initiation due to lesser number of people in the population left available for 
vaccination (and being protected from the disease) as the pandemic goes on 
for a longer period of time.  
From the repeated simulations of a pandemic managed by an NMPC-
optimized vaccine allocation scheme, it is also evident that consistent patterns 
of age-specific vaccine allocations emerge among the various simulations run 
under different conditions. When vaccination is initiated, the NMPC scheme 
recommends immediate emphasis on vaccinating children between ages 5 to 
19. From the contact matrix shown in Figure 3.2 (in Chapter 3), it can be seen 
that this group has higher than average rate of contacts for both within their 
age groups and with others outside of their age group. Hence, the 
recommendation made by the NMPC scheme here is probably to target 
individuals that have high contact rates (children to teenagers in this study) for 
initial phase vaccination to perhaps slow down disease transmission. 
Following this, the next age groups targeted for vaccination are young adults 
of 20 to 44 years old, before focusing on middle-aged adults between 45 and 
59 years of age. It is noted that these are the age groups over-represented in 
the death cases for the baseline scenario.  
As mentioned, these age-specific vaccine allocation trends are consistent 
across different scenarios, and apply even to the unfavorable scenarios for 
halved vaccine stock or delayed vaccination program initiation, and therefore 
can be applicable for any future disease with H1N1 flu-like epidemiology. 
Across the different scenarios, only the period of time over which vaccination 
is given to the respective age groups differs, and the appropriate length of such 
periods be assessed based on NMPC optimization. Additionally, the initial 




stages of these trends agree broadly with the recommendations made by the 
CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices to focus vaccinations 
on children aged 6 months to 18 years and young adults aged 19 years to 24 
years for the 2009 H1N1 flu [83]. 
Including hospitalizations in the objective function (section 4.2.5) results 
in better control due to the NMPC acting earlier to correct for hospitalizations 
that will eventually lead to deaths. However, minimizing hospitalizations was 
not included in the objective function for our further research due to the lack 
of accurate data availability in the health websites, inconsistent definition of 
H1N1 hospitalizations throughout the outbreak of H1N1 and a majority of in-
silico intervention planning studies in the literature concentrating solely on 
minimizing deaths instead. Here, it has to be noted that a better control similar 
to the results discussed in section 4.2.5 could be achieved by solely 
minimizing cumulative deaths, but with a larger prediction horizon. Provided 
that the model is good, a larger horizon will be able to predict future deaths 
without the need for use of hospitalizations within the cost function. However, 
a longer horizon would imply that the resulting controller may be more 
sensitive to model errors. In addition, the prediction horizon was selected as “7 
days” to commensurate the policy making aspects of health authorities during 
disease outbreaks. Due to these reasons, further research was conducted only 
by including minimizing deaths in the objective function and a prediction 
horizon of 7 days. 
  




4.4.  Summary 
This chapter illustrated a NMPC based optimum vaccine allocation strategy 
to counter infectious disease outbreaks. A variety of empirical scenarios were 
tested to individually consider the effects of R0, available vaccine stock and 
promptness of vaccination program on averting hospitalizations and deaths. In 
addition, comparison studies between different flu pandemics, empirical 
studies on the effect of weightings of deaths and/or hospitalizations in the 
objective function and the effect of over-reacting or under-reacting to a 
disease outbreak were conducted. The NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation 
scheme for each of these scenarios was then compared with three other 
adaptive vaccine allocation schemes. In all cases, the NMPC scheme proves to 
be most successful, albeit by varying degrees, in averting deaths and 
hospitalizations among the four strategies being compared. It is to be noted 
that the NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation scheme proposed here is not 
solely specific to H1N1 pandemic – it can also be applied to any highly 
infectious disease that can similarly spark off a pandemic. Once parameterized 
and calibrated accordingly for the particular outbreak, the NMPC scheme is 
likely to be successful in optimally allocating vaccines for minimizing deaths, 
or hospitalizations, or whichever objective function is deemed to be 
appropriate. However, one of the limitations of this research, at this stage, is 
that the mismatch between actual and reported infections, hospitalizations and 
deaths has not been accounted for. Mismatch between actual and reported 
hospitalizations and deaths can vary between different regions based on their 
healthcare infrastructure. The compartmental epidemiological model used for 
in-silico data generation does not include this heterogeneity aspect of reporting 




in infections, hospitalizations and deaths. Disparities between the reporting 
rates of different population subdivisions must be included in the 
epidemiological model and factored into the NMPC based intervention 
planning. To this end, the next chapter will present a realistic, four-community 
agent-based epidemiological model that will include the spatial component, 
movement of individuals between communities and the community-specific 





















5. NMPC BASED INTERVENTION PLANNING FOR 
A REALISTIC SCENARIO 
 
This chapter will present the results and analysis of the NMPC based 
vaccine allocation for various realistic scenarios, in which only the reported 
cases (reported infections, hospitalizations and deaths) that occurred in the 
communities were made available for the NMPC scheme to optimize vaccine 
allocation. Online sampling of weekly data from the calibrated agent-based 
system will be used to estimate the age-wise vaccine allocation ratios using the 
Non-linear Model Predictive Control scheme developed in Chapter 4. The 
control algorithm will be used to estimate the number of vaccines to be 
administered for each age-group for the subsequent week in the agent-based 
system. A pictorial representation of the process control diagram for this 




Figure 5.1 Process Control diagram for NMPC based intervention planning 




Section 5.1 will present the agent based system (a virtual population of 4 
communities) that will be used to generate realistic epidemiological data. The 
key attributes of the agent based system developed in this chapter include the 
community-specific heterogeneity in reporting of cases and hospitalizations 
and the movement of infected individuals between communities.  
5.1. Agent-based Epidemiological Model 
In this section, an age-structured agent-based epidemiological model that 
we have developed to simulate an epidemic spread in a scaled-down version of 
the US population will be presented. In addition, the following aspects will be 
covered: 
 Calibration of the 15 age-structured model to H1N1 2009 pandemic, 
and 
 Validation of the agent-based model using estimates from the 
compartmental model discussed in Chapter 3 
An age-structured agent-based epidemiological model was developed to 
simulate an epidemic spread in a scaled-down version of the US population. 
The population was split into fifteen distinct groups of individuals, based on 
their age. The population of 2 million agents was spread across 4 
communities, with each community accommodating 0.5 million individuals. 
Age-specific risk factors relevant to the spread (such as contact patterns), 
morbidity and mortality of pandemic influenza, age-specific probabilities of 
hospitalizations and subsequent deaths and efficacies of vaccination were 
based on studies of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak and other relevant 
influenza outbreaks. Such age-wise stratification improved the 
characterization of differing levels of risk to pandemic influenza and hence 




better represented the impacts of an age-wise selective vaccine allocation 
strategy. The disease progression state chart used in the agent-based model is 
similar to the one described in section 3.1.  
5.1.1. Model Parameterization and Calibration 
Population and epidemiological parameters used in the calibration of the 
agent-based model are given in Table 5.1. Population details for the model 
was sourced from the U.S. 2010 census [62]. Age-specific contact rates among 
individuals in the virtual population were sourced from a study of contact 
patterns in eight European countries [63]. Age-specific hospitalization and 
case fatality rates for hospitalized cases were based on a Bayesian analysis 
study of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza in the United States [64]. Vaccinated 
individuals are assumed to develop protection after 10 days of vaccination 
[31]. Vaccine efficacy is assumed to be 77.5% for individuals under 65 years 
old and 35% for individuals over 65 years old, based on various influenza 
vaccine immunogenicity studies [65-68]. Rate of progression from exposed to 
infectious compartments are taken to be 1/1.9, based on influenza antiviral 
studies [69]. Recovery rates for infectious and hospitalized individuals were 
parameterized based on studies conducted on pandemic influenza. The mixing 
of agents across communities has been incorporated into the model to study 
the spread of infection on an inter-community scale. Mixing across 
communities is controlled through 2 parameters, one which defines the 
percentage of infected people moving out of each community (pm_out), and 
the other that describes the probability that a person moving out a particular 
community enters other communities (pm_in). These 2 parameters have been 




used to regulate the flow of the infected population from one community to 
another. The community-specific heterogeneity in reporting of cases and 
hospitalizations are given in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Community-specific heterogeneity in reporting of cases and 
hospitalizations 
Community 
Probability that an individual 
reports infection 
Probablity that an individual gets 
hospitalized 
1 1 1 
2 triangular (0.7,0.8,0.9) triangular (0.8,0.85,0.9) 
3 triangular (0.5,0.6,0.7) triangular (0.6,0.7,0.8) 
4 triangular (0.4,0.5,0.6) triangular (0.5,0.6,0.7) 
5.1.1 (a) Population distribution in each community 
 
Figure 5.2  Population distribution in each community 
5.1.2. Calibration of q (Probability of Transmission per Contact) 
Statistics of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak obtained from the 
compartmental epidemiological model corresponding to R0=1.8 (developed in 
Chapter 3) were used for the calibration of q, the probability of transmission of 
influenza through every contact with infectious individuals. Using these 
estimated data, the value for q was calibrated such that for the period before 
vaccination was initiated and the first account of vaccine distribution, the 

































































H1N1 deaths per 1000 and H1N1 hospitalizations per 1000 predicted by the 
agent-based model were comparable to that of the corresponding numbers 
estimated using the calibrated compartmental epidemiological model as shown 
in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Calibration of the agent-based model using statistics from the ODE 
model corresponding to R0=1.8 
5.2. Intervention Planning for Realistic Scenarios 
Online sampling of in-silico epidemiological weekly data from the 
calibrated agent-based model was used to estimate the age-wise vaccine 
allocation ratios using the Non-linear Model Predictive Control scheme. The 
control algorithm was used to estimate the number of vaccines to be 
administered for each age-group for the subsequent week in the agent-based 
model. The ODE model used by the NMPC scheme, parameters of the ODE 
model, the constraints and NMPC scheme related details are given in Table 
5.3. In-silico trials were conducted towards understanding as to how the 
deaths/hospitalizations averted would vary depending upon whether the 




























































decisions were made at a community level (decentralized decision making) or 
for the entire virtual world (centralized decision making). 
Table 5.3 Details of the NMPC scheme used for intervention planning 
True system Agent based epidemiological system described in 
section 5.1 
System model used by 
NMPC 
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Constraints               is a vector of zeros, 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations, 
              is a vector of zeros, 
   is a replicated vector of initial populations, 
∑     
  
   , 
              is a vector of zeros, 




              is a vector of ones. 
Prediction Horizon 1 Week 
Control Horizon 1 day (for every 1
st day of the epidemiological week, 
the control action is applied once. The vaccine 
allocation profile is kept constant for the next 6 days) 
Weights on Outputs The 9th diagonal element in   which corresponds to 
deaths is set to 1 while the diagonal elements in   
corresponding to the rest of the controlled variables 
are set to 0 
States                             
              
Inputs (multiple-variables)   
   
              
A series of empirical studies were conducted to investigate the impacts of 
using the NMPC scheme under different conditions to achieve the same 
objective of minimizing deaths. Here, it has to be noted that the vaccine 
allocation related constraints occurred at the global level. In this chapter, the 
following scenarios will be investigated: 
 An ideal scenario in which the actual cases (actual infections, 
hospitalizations and deaths) that occurred in all the communities – 
referred to as the ‘complete reporting of epidemiological information’ 
– was made available for the NMPC scheme to propose vaccine 
allocation for the whole virtual world. This is analogous to having a 
‘centralized controller’ for intervention planning of the whole virtual 
world based on actual data. Hereafter, this scenario will be referred as 
‘Version1’.  
 Different realistic scenarios in which only the reported cases (reported 
infections, hospitalizations and deaths) that occurred in the 
communities – referred to as the ‘incomplete reporting of 
epidemiological information’ – were made available for the NMPC 




scheme to optimize vaccine allocation. The following realistic 
scenarios were evaluated using the NMPC scheme: 
o Version-2, a scenario that has access to the incomplete 
epidemiological data reported by all four communities, and uses 
this to recommend generalized vaccine allocations for all four 
communities. At every sampling point, the NMPC scheme is only 
given access to the reported epidemiological information of the 
outbreak by the communities. Hence, the controller has to base its 
vaccine allocation optimization on this limited information to 
recommend a generalized age-specific vaccine allocation strategy 
applicable to all four communities. This is analogous to having a 
‘centralized controller’ for intervention planning of the whole 
virtual world based on reported data. 
o Version 3 to version 6, a scenario in which reported data from the 
individual communities were used to recommend specialized 
vaccine allocations back to the respective community. Here, every 
community has a NMPC controller (Version 3 – Community 1, 
Version 4 – Community 2, Version 5 – Community 3, Version 6 – 
Community 4). The respective controllers then base their vaccine 
allocation on this limited information to recommend an age-
specific vaccine allocation strategy strictly applicable to the 
particular community from which the epidemiological information 
was reported. This is analogous to having a ‘decentralized 
controller’ for intervention planning for the individual communities 
based on reported data. 




o Version-7, a scenario that uses the incomplete epidemiological data 
reported from the community which has the highest number of 
reported infections at that particular point in the outbreak for every 
sampling period, and uses this data to recommend generalized 
vaccine allocations for all four communities. This is analogous to a 
situation in which the disease related information is shared among 
the communities and the decisions are taken in a centralized 
manner based on the information shared. 
5.3. Results and Discussion 
5.3.1 Baseline Scenario 
The dynamics of a simulated outbreak in a baseline scenario, where no 
vaccination is applied, is shown in Figure 5.4. In the baseline scenario, the 
outbreak reaches the peak of infection in Week 18.  
 
Figure 5.4  Baseline Scenario showing the trends for infections, cumulative 
hospitalizations and cumulative deaths 




The number of infections and hence, hospitalizations and deaths subsides 
thereafter till Week 32, when no further infections occur. A plateau in the 
number of infections between Weeks 13 to 15 can be observed, before the 
trend increases to reach the peak at Week 18. This can be explained by 
breaking the plot of total infections into the four constituent communities that 
comprise the population under study, as shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5  Number of Infected/Cumulative-Infected in the Individual 
Communities 
Figure 5.5 shows the individual trends for number of infections and 
cumulative infections for each of the communities. It is to be noted that 3
rd
 
community (henceforth known as ‘Comm3’) is the community in which the 
initial infection was introduced among the entire population. Hence, the 
infection trend in Comm3 is the first to peak before the rest of the 
communities do so. There is a considerable delay (of about five weeks) before 
infections build up in Comm3 to high enough levels so as to spread the 
infection from Comm3 into other communities. As a result, the peaks of 
infection are delayed to Week 18 for Comm1, Comm2 and Comm4, as 
compared to Week 13 for Comm3. During the delay period in between the 
peaks, infections for Comm3 begin to fall while infections for the other three 




communities rise. As a result, the infection trend for the total virtual world as a 
whole plateaus between Weeks 13 to 15 for the entire population. From then 
on, infections in Comm1, Comm2 and Comm4 dominate to push the total 
infections trend upwards again to peak at Week 18. 
5.3.2. Complete Reporting based Decision Making 
This scenario, termed as ‘Version-1’, refers to an ideal scenario in which 
complete reporting of epidemiological information was made available for the 
NMPC scheme to optimize vaccine allocation. The effect of vaccination is 
clearly evident in Figure 5.6. As expected, a large number of deaths and 
hospitalizations that would have happened in the baseline scenario have been 
averted. 79.79% of hospitalizations and 80.39% of deaths (compared to 
baseline) have been averted on average with the use of the NMPC scheme 
based vaccination (results averaged from 5 stochastic trials).  
 
Figure 5.6  Comparison of Version-1 with baseline scenario 
 




Also, notably, vaccination hampers the growth of the outbreak such that herd 
immunity come into play from Week 8 onwards (when the vaccination 
program is initiated), Version-1 always has lower number of infections than 
the baseline scenario at the same point in time (as expected and as illustrated 
in the inner-panel of Figure 5.6). Furthermore, vaccination effect is significant 
enough by Week 13 to lead to subsequent reductions in new infections for 
Version-1. The number of infections at the peak is also lower for Version-1 
than for the baseline scenario by nearly six times. Figure 5.7 illustrates how 
the NMPC-based optimization scheme in Version-1 allocated the vaccines 
among the different age groups of the population. 
 
Figure 5.7 Vaccine Allocation Ratio heat-maps for Version-1 
A detailed examination of the vaccine allocation ratio heat-map reveals as 
to how the NMPC based vaccination was able to reduce the deaths and 
hospitalizations by as much as 80%. From Figure 5.7, it can be seen that for 
the earlier weeks that the vaccination is carried out, vaccines are allocated in a 
much focused manner. Vaccines are allocated to only one or two of the age 
groups from Week 8 onwards (when the vaccination program is initiated) till 




Week 20. The basic ideology behind this approach might is to completely 
focus on the one or two critical age groups that if left unvaccinated (or given 
lower amounts of vaccination), would be overrepresented in the number of 
deaths in the future time-period relative to the total number of deaths from 
other age groups. There is probably a critical time period during an outbreak 
before which vaccination should be quickly initiated, for the intervention to be 
effective. This critical period may be well before the peak occurs [82]. 
Therefore, before the infection peak at Week 13, as well as some time after the 
peak, vaccines were still recommended in a much focused way so as to draw 
as much efficacy out of them as is possible. 
The vaccine allocation trend starts off with focusing on children and young 
adults between 5 to 24 years old for the first three weeks of vaccination. There 
may have been a rush to vaccinate individuals from these age groups right at 
the begining due to the fact that these children and young adults have contact 
rates much higher than the average (as illustrated in the contact matrix shown 
in Figure 3.2). Therefore, individuals from this age group had the greatest 
chances of being infected. Hence, the recommendation made by the NMPC 
scheme here is probably to target individuals with high contact rates at the 
initial stages (children and young adults in this study).  
For the subsequent Week 4 to Week 6, a shift in vaccination occurs and 
middle-aged adults between 35 to 49 years of age are specially targeted for 
vaccination. It is probable that after a good amount of the vaccines were used 
on children and young adults early on, the contribution to the overall deaths 
from these individuals is reduced. Thus, these age groups slip behind the 




middle-aged adults in terms of being the leading contributor to the total 
deaths.  
Following this, the vaccination focus shifts between the previously 
mentioned age groups all the way until the 15
th
 week of vaccination, with 
some sporadic emphasis on those in age groups of 0 to 4 years old and 55 to 
59 years old. Lastly, from Week 22 of vaccination onwards, the allocation 
resolves itself into always sharing vaccines among individuals between 25 to 
34 years of age. This exactly coincides with no further new deaths in the entire 
population. As the effectiveness of vaccines fall sharply the later they are 
administered during an epidemic, it may not be prudent to continue 
vaccination at this stage to justify the resource costs of continuing to invest in 
vaccination. Herd immunity may be more than enough to ensure that the 
pandemic ends without the need for further vaccination, as by this point, the 
fraction of the population that has been protected by vaccination has already 
exceeded the threshold of   
 
  
 for the elimination of transmission [81]. 
Hence, the vaccination was stopped after Week 32. 
5.3.3. Incomplete Reporting based Decision Making 
The previous scenario which simulated the complete reporting of 
epidemiological information for use by the NMPC scheme, to optimally 
allocate vaccines, is not realistic. In practice, collection of epidemiological 
data during flu seasons and even during epidemic outbreaks can be expected to 
have significant degrees of under-reporting, reporting inaccuracies as a result 
of systemic issues. To this end, a more realistic study is carried out with 
different levels of under-reporting incorporated into the epidemiological data 




collected from individual communities in the agent-based model, henceforth 
known as “Version-2”. Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the extent of the 
impact of under-reporting on the number of infections and hospitalizations 
reported in comparison with the actual numbers for the baseline scenario.  
 
Figure 5.8 Actual versus reported infections 
 
Figure 5.9  Actual versus reported hospitalizations 




5.3.3 (a) Under-reporting and Disease Characterization 
For Version-2, Version-3to6 and Version-7, epidemiological information 
has been reported completely in Comm1, however, increasingly under-
reported from Comm2 to Comm4. Figure 5.10 shows the estimates for the 
number of cases and hospitalizations reported in total over the simulation 
period for the baseline scenario, as compared to the actual number of cases 
and hospitalizations that happens on-ground. This heterogeneity in reporting 
for the different communities therefore leads to increasingly unreliable 
information being used by policy makers to strategize interventions.  
 
Figure 5.10 Cases per 1000 and Hospitalizations per 1000 - actual versus 
reported 
 
Thus, the resultant vaccine allocations posed would be increasingly 
mismatched with the outbreak situation on-ground. In addition, this leads to 
the dangerous presumption that the disease situation in Comm3 and Comm4 
are less severe than they actually are. This might lead to disproportionately 




fewer resources allocated to these two communities as opposed to Comm1 and 
Comm2, as and when they are available. Figure 5.11 presents the disease 
characterization (severity estimates) based on the actual versus reported data. 
While the actual number of hospitalizations given infections, deaths given 
hospitalizations and deaths given infections are comparable among the four 
communities, the reported number are artificially inflated for Comm3 and 
especially so for Comm4. Therefore, it is of utmost importance when 
conducting policy planning to consider the reporting related heterogeneity and 
analyze the intervention effectiveness for such realistic scenarios. 
 
Figure 5.11  Disease characterization based on actual versus reported data 
With the simulation of Version-2, a drop in performance as compared to 
Version-1 can be expected due to the incomplete data access that the NMPC 
scheme has, as opposed to the ideal scenario of Version-1. The predictions in 
this scenario are based on incomplete data and hence, the vaccine allocations 
are sub-optimal when compared with Version-1. This leads to higher 




infections, hospitalizations and deaths as illustrated in Figure 5.12. As seen in 
Figure 5.12, the number of infections at the peak of the outbreak increases 
slightly by 6.78%, however, the peak of the infection occurs at Week 13. Yet, 
the number of hospitalizations increases significantly by 26.76%, and the 
number of deaths increase by 13.39% over Version-1. This clearly 
demonstrates the effect of the incomplete reporting of epidemiological 
information on vaccination effectiveness.  
Figure 5.13 shows the differences between the vaccine allocations 
recommended by Version-1 and Version-2. Version-2 has several significant 
differences in vaccine allocation from Version-1. While Version-2 also starts 
off the initial stage of the vaccination by focusing on children and young 
adults between 5 to 24 years of age. Version-2 takes four instead of three 
weeks focusing on this group of young individuals before switching over the 
emphasis on vaccinating older group of adults between the ages of 40 to 69 
years. 
 
Figure 5.12  Comparison of Version-2 with Version-1 





Figure 5.13  Vaccine Allocation Ratio comparisons between Version-1 and 
Version-2 
Most markedly, there is less focusing of vaccines on single age groups to 
the near-exclusion of other age groups, especially after the peak of infection 
and in between Weeks 9 to 14 of the vaccination period. This is significant as 
it means that the incomplete reporting of epidemiological data has hampered 
NMPC’s accurate prediction of future states and deduction of the age groups 
in most need of vaccination at several time points. There is an additionally 
notable feature in the vaccine allocation for Version-2 that did not previously 
occur for Version-1 – the focused vaccine allocations in Weeks 27 to 30 of the 
outbreak. This is due to new deaths continuing to occur past Week 28 and only 
ceasing three weeks later in Week 31 for Version-2.  
5.3.4. Extended Scenarios of Incomplete Reporting based Decision 
Making 
 Two more scenarios, Version-3to6, as well as Version-7, in which 
incomplete reporting of epidemiological information was made available for 
the NMPC scheme to optimize vaccine allocation were studied. The 




comparative results are presented in Figure 5.14. For all the three different 
scenarios that use incomplete reporting of epidemiological information, the 
infection peak occurs on Week 13. At this peak, all the three scenarios have 
similar number of peak infections. However, there are distinct differences 
between the number of eventual hospitalizations and deaths.  
 
Figure 5.14  Comparison of Version-3to6 and Version-7 versus Version-2 
From Figure 5.14, it is evident that relative to Version-2, Version-3to6 
report a remarkable 32.92% reduction in hospitalizations and 30.31% 
reduction in deaths. Version-7 posts even better results against Version-2 with 
47.34% less hospitalizations and 48.43% less deaths. The supremacy of 
Version-7 shows the importance of sharing-based decision making. Here, it 
has to be noted that the decision making in version7 is based on worst case 
scenario among all the 4 communities. 
In Version-7, the NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation decision is made 
based on data (albeit incomplete) from the community dealing with the worst 
number of infections, and this is shared with all the other communities. In 




such a case, the community which is first to experience the outbreak can have 
the vaccine allocation appropriately devised, and then can share the allocation 
details with other communities. Therefore, this vaccine allocation will suit the 
rest of the communities for preemptively vaccinating individuals in the other 
communities. This strategy would best help other communities to deal with the 
outbreak when it later develops in those locales, by making use of knowledge 
about the disease characteristics from the first community which comes in 
contact with the disease. 
Efforts were made to compare Version-7 with Version-1 to understand as 
to how the deaths/hospitalizations averted would vary depending upon the 
completeness of the epidemiological information made available for the 
NMPC scheme to optimize vaccine allocation versus sharing of 
epidemiological information among communities as and when they are 
available. The results are presented in Figure 5.15. Interestingly, Version-7 is 
even able to outperform Version-1 beyond expectations, taking into account 
that Version-1 had access to the complete epidemiological information. It may 
be the case that at the same peak of infection at Week 13, Version-7 has 
11.29% more infections than Version-1. However, eventually, Version-7 ends 
up with 33.25% less hospitalizations and 41.52% fewer deaths than Version-1. 





Figure 5.15  Comparison of Version-7 versus Version-1 
A comparison on the deaths averted and hospitalizations averted among all 
the scenarios, as shown in Figure 5.16, illustrates the supremacy of Version-7 
again. Version-3to6 is able to outperform Version-1 as well. The 
personalization of vaccine allocation to suit the specific community needs as 
relevant to their own outbreak status is alone able to make up for an 
information gap. In addition, information sharing among communities 
(Version-7) can further avert more cases, hospitalizations and deaths. Figure 
5.17 shows a comparative overview of the vaccine allocations used by all the 
four scenarios. It can be seen that Version-3to6, which performs marginally 
better than Version-1, uses a quite different vaccine allocation over Version-1. 
The key factor in Version-3to6 outperforming Version-1 is that the vaccine 
allocation is much more effective in Comm3, which was the first infected 
community. 





Figure 5.16 Deaths averted and Hospitalizations averted for all versions 
 
Figure 5.17 Vaccine Allocation Ratio comparison plots for Version-2, Version-
3to6 and Version-7 
In Version-7, the NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation decision is made 
based on data (albeit incomplete) from the community dealing with the worst 
number of infections, and this is shared with all the other communities. From 
Figure 5.17, it is evident that when vaccination is initiated for Version-7, the 
NMPC scheme recommends immediate emphasis on vaccinating individuals 
aged between ages 40 to 44. From the probability of death following 
hospitalization shown in Table 3.1 (in Chapter 3), it can be seen that this group 




is one of the groups that has higher than average probability of death. Hence, 
the recommendation made by the NMPC scheme here is probably to target 
individuals that have high probability of death for initial phase vaccination to 
directly minimize the number of deaths. A detailed examination of the vaccine 
allocation ratio heat-map reveals as to how the NMPC based vaccination was 
able to reduce the deaths and hospitalizations by as much as 41%. From Figure 
5.17, it can be seen that for the earlier weeks that the vaccination is carried 
out, vaccines are allocated in a much focused manner, on the group that has 
higher than average probability of death. Vaccines are allocated to only two or 
three of the age groups from Week 10 onwards till Week 16. The basic 
ideology behind this approach might be to completely focus on the one or two 
critical age groups that if left unvaccinated (or given lower amounts of 
vaccination), would be overrepresented in the number of deaths in the future 
time-period relative to the total number of deaths from other age groups. It is 
for these reasons that Versions 3-6 performs better than Version 2 as well. 
In Version-1, the severity effect and subsequent age-wise marginalization 
of the outbreak in Comm3 is diluted by the outbreak not even starting yet in 
the rest of the communities at the initial stage. This can be seen from the first 
three weeks of inconsequential vaccine allocation in Version-3to6. However, 
vaccines supplied here could have been better used by the communities if they 
were focused on age groups that needed them the most, as illustrated by the 
proposed vaccine allocation in Version-7. In this case, the sharing of 
information from the first-hit community is able to help the rest of the 
communities to strategize age-specific vaccination, and more than make up for 
the information gap. Version-7 is a worst case scenario. Minimizing a worst 




case scenario, in terms of cumulative deaths, may always result in better 
outcome, provided that there are enough vaccines available to deal with the 
worst scenario. 
5.4. Summary 
The NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation scheme has been successful, 
being able to reduce deaths and hospitalizations from baseline levels by at 
least 76% and 73% respectively in all scenarios investigated in this chapter. 
The incomplete reporting of information can lower the effectiveness of the 
NMPC scheme (as illustrated in 5.3.2), while dangerously making the 
outbreak appear less severe than it really is (as shown in Figure 5.10). Yet, 
optimizing the vaccine allocation at a community-level as opposed to doing so 
at a population level is able to make up for the information gap, and 
information-sharing based decision making can further improve the 
intervention effectiveness (as illustrated in  Figure 5.15). Eventually, with 
small changes in the vaccine allocation, the resultant number of cases, 
hospitalizations and deaths can change drastically. Hence, it is vital for the 
policymakers to locate communities that would report complete or near-
complete epidemiological information about an outbreak as is possible; so as 
to make the best use of the NMPC based vaccine allocation and similar 
intervention strategies. It might also be useful to understand the healthcare 
heterogeneity among communities and include the understanding for in-silico 
intervention planning. The next chapter will address this issue, of 
understanding the socioeconomic heterogeneity in healthcare among US 
counties. 




6. UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIOECONOMIC 
HETEROGENEITY IN HEALTHCARE AMONG 
US COUNTIES 
 
The outbreak of H1N1 2009 has provided the scientific community a sad 
but excellent opportunity to understand the influence of socio-economic 
determinants on pandemic mortality. The aim of this chapter is to identify the 
subgroups of the population whose members share common characteristics 
that are barriers or facilitators of health-related interventions. To this end, we 
have used data collected from 341 US counties to model H1N1 deaths per 
1000 using twelve socio-economic predictors to find out why certain counties 
reported fewer H1N1 deaths when compared with other counties. Hence, the 
objectives of this chapter are: 
 To understand the relationship between each of the selected predictors 
and the response variable, 
 To develop a decision tree using the selected predictors, predict the 
total deaths due to H1N1 in US using the decision tree and compare 
the estimates with the deaths reported by CDC, US, and 
 Use the validated model to offer guidance to local health officials (at 
state level and county level) to strategize community health 
improvement planning. 
 





6.1.1. Data Collection 
Data were collected from several public health websites of US. Data on 
socio-demographic variables and socio-economic indicators were collected 
from US census and Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, US) 
websites [84, 85]. The response variable of interest is the reported H1N1 
deaths per 1000 population, with final predictor variables being socio-
economic variables. The list of predictors used in the dataset is shown in Table 
6.1. We collected the most up-to-date data for each of the predictors and hence 
the difference in the year of collection.  








































































































5 Education 1* 2000 20.0 8.8 60.5 5.4 1.1 




Source: 1* = US census; 2* = CDC, US; 3* = State health websites 
†
Note: The corresponding summary characteristic of a variable for the whole 
of US is shown in the parenthesis 
H1N1 deaths in the US were reported from July 2009 till June 2010. 
County-level H1N1 deaths related data were collected from the State Health 
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H1N1 web links of all the 50 states of US were browsed thoroughly for data 
availability. Only 14 states out of the 50 that reported latest county records of 
H1N1 deaths from July 2009 till June 2010 were selected. The primary reason 
for such a selection is that only these states have consistent reporting and 
updating of H1N1 statistics. Here, the phrase “consistent reporting and 
updating of H1N1 statistics” refers to the reporting standards met by the state 
health websites in par with the standards suggested by the Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention, USA. Only these 14 states reported county-wise 
statistics on H1N1 deaths per 1000 and hence were included in the dataset. 
Rest of the states had either reported the cumulative deaths for the whole of 
the state or did not update the county-level statistics in their health websites. 
The state-wise details on the number of counties that reported H1N1 death and 
the corresponding web pages are shown in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 State-wise details of the data collected 
State 











































South Dakota 66 14 http://doh.sd.gov/Flu/PDF/Week13.pdf 
















A choropleth map of the 341 counties is shown in Figure 6.1. This dataset 




Figure 6.1 Counties of US included in the dataset 
6.1.2. Data Analysis  
The following exploratory data analyses were performed to gain insights 
into the relationships between the predictors and the response variable. 




Correlation analysis: This was performed in order to quantify the linear 
association between each of the selected predictors and the response variable 
[87].  
Decision Trees: Modeling with decision tree results in a pictorial 
representation comprising of a series of if-then rules to predict H1N1 deaths 
per 1000. Construction of decision trees can aid in the illustration of certain 
“rules” governing the spread of H1N1 and H1N1 related deaths. Policy makers 
can use these rules as the basis to target and optimize the distribution of public 
health resources. Decision tree analysis is a nonparametric methodology that 
has the ability to classify populations into subgroups [88]. Recently, decision 
tree methodology has been extensively applied in public health analyses [89] - 
e.g., in studies assessing risk factors for mortality and morbidity from specific 
diseases [90-94], identifying patients hospitalized with community-acquired 
pneumonia [95] and influenza treatment strategies [96-98]. The three basic 
steps of building a decision tree are: (1) The overall study group is divided 
into two subgroups using the most dominant predictor of the response 
variable. (2) This division into two groups is repeated within the subgroups 
until no further significant splits are found. At this point, a terminal node is 
created. (3) The results are then presented in the form of a binary tree 
structure, which can be pruned to obtain the optimal tree with the least 
misclassification. The response variable can be either categorical (i.e., 
classification tree) or continuous (i.e., regression tree). The predictors can be a 
mix of categorical and continuous variables. In a classification tree, the 
probability of having the response measure is estimated among those within 




each node. In regression trees, the mean value of the response variable is 
estimated among those within each node.  
Here, we have used H1N1 deaths per 1000 as the target variable and built 
a regression tree using the twelve selected predictors. The entire sample was 
used to develop the regression tree and 10-fold cross-validation method was 
used as the tree testing option to select the best tree [88]. Pruning was done to 
avoid over-fitting and the optimal tree was chosen based on the cost of the 
tree. The procedure described here was coded in MATLAB 7.8.0 (R2009a). 
The regression tree developed using data from 341 counties was then used to 
predict H1N1 mortality for the whole of US. The predictor variables for all the 
counties of US were collected from the US census website. The decision rule 
obtained from the regression tree was used as the basis to determine the H1N1 
deaths per 1000 for each county depending upon its input variables. These 
predictions were then converted to total H1N1 deaths predicted for each 
county. The state-wise H1N1 deaths were then obtained from the county 
totals. H1N1 mortality for the whole of US was then obtained from the 
summation of state-wise H1N1 deaths. 
6.2. Results 
6.2.1. Correlation analysis 
The independent variables, namely population per square mile, percent 
resident population black and the response variable, H1N1 deaths per 1000, 
were highly skewed. Hence, these variables were log transformed (indicated 
by symbol LN in Table 6.3). Correlation coefficient (r) of the predictors with 




respect to the response variable, 95% confidence interval and the associated p-
values are shown in Table 6.3.  
From Table 6.3, it is evident that of the twelve predictors, ten are 
statistically significant (p<0.05). Percent resident population under 18 years 
and percent resident population white are statistically insignificant. Population 
density, income, education and percent resident population black show a 
negative correlation. Poverty, obesity, percent resident population under 5 
years and percent resident population 65 years and over show a positive 
correlation. All the twelve selected predictors were then used to construct the 
regression tree and develop decision rules using the most significant splitting 
variables. Here, it has to be noted that the actual values of the twelve selected 
predictors (not the log transformed ones) were used for constructing the 
regression tree. 
Table 6.3 Correlation coefficient of the potential predictors with respect to H1N1 
death per 1000 population 
No. Predictors r rLower rUpper 
p 
value 
1 LN (Population per square mile) 
-
0.55 
-0.62 -0.47 <0.001 
2 Per capita personal income 
-
0.35 
-0.44 -0.25 <0.001 
3 Median household income 
-
0.44 
-0.52 -0.35 <0.001 
4 
Educational attainment - persons 25 years and 
over –  
percent high school graduate or higher 
-
0.37 
-0.46 -0.27 <0.001 
5 
Educational attainment - persons 25 years and 
over –  
percent bachelor's degree or higher 
-
0.34 
-0.43 -0.24 <0.001 
6 People of all ages in poverty - percent 0.44 0.35 0.52 <0.001 
7 Obesity-Age Adjusted Estimated Percent 0.24 0.13 0.34 <0.001 
8 Percent resident population under 5 years 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.05 
9 Percent resident population under 18 years 0.08 -0.03 0.18 0.14 
10 Percent resident population 65 years and over 0.17 0.07 0.27 0.001 
11 Percent resident population white 
-
0.05 
-0.16 0.05 0.33 
12 LN (Percent resident population black 
-
0.19 
-0.29 -0.09 <0.001 




6.2.2. Regression Tree 
The best regression tree generated using the procedure described in the 
Methods section is shown in Figure 6.2. Of the twelve predictors used for 
constructing the tree, only six of them showed up as splitting variables in the 
decision tree. These six predictors include: population density, percent with 
bachelor’s degree education, percent in poverty, percent of population of black 
race, percent 65 years old and over and percent of population of white race. 
This tree contains fourteen terminal nodes. H1N1 deaths per 1000 estimated 
from the regression tree ranged from 0.0125 to 0.3779. 
 
Figure 6.2  Regression tree 
The first variable selected for splitting was population density. Among 
those counties which had a population density (measured in population per 
square mile) greater than 30.7, a further split was observed for those which 
had a population density greater (or lesser) than 53.05. Counties that had a 




population density greater than 145.4 and percent of population of black race 
greater than 1.25 reported the least number (0.0125) of H1N1 deaths per 1000 
people. Among the counties that had a population density greater than 145.4 
and population of black race lesser than 1.25, a further split was observed for 
those which had a population density greater (or lesser) than 400.3. Counties 
that had a population density in the range of 145.4 – 400.3 and percent of 
population of black race lesser than 1.25, reported 0.0130 H1N1 deaths per 
1000. However, counties that had a population density greater than 400.3 and 
percent of population of black race lesser than 1.25 reported 0.1989 H1N1 
deaths per 1000. Thus, for counties with similar percent of population of black 
race and a population density greater than 145.4, a much higher population 
density has resulted in H1N1 deaths fourteen times higher than the second 
least number of H1N1 deaths per 1000. Counties with population density 
lesser than 30.7 reported H1N1 deaths per 1000 ranging from 0.0461 to 
0.3779. The group that had a population density lesser than 30.7 was further 
split according to educational attainment (bachelor's degree or higher). 
Counties with educational attainment lesser than 8.8 reported 0.3314 H1N1 
deaths per 1000.  A further split on the group with higher education was based 
on percent in poverty, population density, education, percent 65 years old and 
over and percent of population of white race. Counties with low population 
density, low educational attainment, and high percent of 65 years old and with 
a combination of low population density, high education and low poverty 
reported higher H1N1 deaths per 1000 when compared with their counterparts. 
The decision tree developed was then used to predict H1N1 mortality for the 
whole of US. A choropleth map with the county-wise predictions of H1N1 




deaths per 1000 is shown in Figure 6.3. From Table 6.3, it is evident that of 
the twelve predictors, ten are statistically significant (p<0.05). Percent resident 
population under 18 years and percent resident population white are 
statistically insignificant. Population density, income, education and percent 
resident population black show a negative correlation. Poverty, obesity, 
percent resident population under 5 years and percent resident population 65 
years and over show a positive correlation. All the twelve selected predictors 
were then used to construct the regression tree and develop decision rules 
using the most significant splitting variables. Here, it has to be noted that the 
actual values of the twelve selected predictors (not the log transformed ones) 
were used for constructing the regression tree. 
 
Figure 6.3 County-wise predictions of H1N1 deaths per 1000 




The light grey color used in the figure corresponds to 0.0125 H1N1 deaths 
per 1000 and the black color corresponds to 0.3779 H1N1 deaths per 1000. 
The values in-between are highlighted using various color intensities between 
light grey and black. Of the 3141 counties included in our predictions, 586 
counties were predicted to have encountered 0.0125 H1N1 deaths per 1000. 14 
counties were predicted to have encountered the maximum (0.3779) H1N1 
deaths per 1000. A choropleth map with the state-wise predictions of H1N1 
deaths per 1000 is shown in Figure 6.4. From our predictions, the top five 
worst hit states during the recent H1N1 would be Wyoming, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Montana and Alaska. Similarly, the bottom five least hit states 
would be Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Maryland. 
 
Figure 6.4  H1N1 deaths per 1000 predictions for each state of US 




Total H1N1 deaths predicted for each state are shown in Figure 6.5. From 
the predictions, we sorted the counties of each state in the order of H1N1 
deaths per 1000. The results are highlighted in the map shown in Figure 6.6. 
For each state, we have highlighted (in black color) the counties which were 
predicted to have encountered maximum H1N1 deaths per 1000 among all the 
counties of that particular state. Similarly, the counties that were predicted to 
have encountered minimum H1N1 deaths per 1000 among all the counties 
were highlighted in light grey color. 
 
Figure 6.5. H1N1 deaths predictions for each state of US 





Figure 6.6  Worst hit and least hit counties for each state of US 
 
6.3. Discussion 
Socio-economic indicators are believed to introduce health heterogeneity 
among the subgroups of the population and our results quantify the impact of 
these indicators on H1N1 mortality in the US. Most of the strong relationship 
that we observed between the predictors and the response variable may be 
attributed to factors such as awareness about the symptoms of the disease, 
health care access, and hospitalization on time. These factors contribute to 
better symptomatic medical management [47]. Increased level of awareness 
for the need to report to relevant authorities and seek medical attention early in 
protecting oneself against the virus can also originate from a higher education 
level of an individual. Higher income can also be associated with the increased 
probability of visiting medical facilities on exhibiting disease related 




symptoms. Higher educational attainment and income results in acquisition of 
skills related to positive attitude about health, access to preventive health 
services membership in peer groups [47]. Influence of per-head income on 
pandemic mortality has been studied in the past [52]. However, a study of this 
magnitude with as many as twelve predictors seems to unreported to any 
significant extent. Previous studies done in the literature could only explain 
half the variance in pandemic mortality, whereas, in our study we improved 
the predictive ability of the models by using decision trees and twelve 
predictors. The recently released county health rankings [99] offers the 
potential to extend the proposed approach for many more predictors such as 
access to care, quality of care etc. 
H1N1 deaths predicted using our study for the whole of US sums up to 
7667. This estimate is in conformance with the lower bound of the CDC 
estimates of 8870 deaths [80]. CDC estimated the prevalence of H1N1 
pandemic using a probabilistic multiplier model that adjusted for sources of 
under-ascertainment. The number of deaths was not directly estimated from 
the model. The ratio of deaths to hospitalizations was found to be 6% using 
the laboratory-confirmed cases. With the assumption that deaths and 
hospitalizations were underreported to the same extent, this fraction was used 
to estimate the bounds for H1N1 deaths using the number of hospitalizations. 
Our results suggest that the deaths due to H1N1 were influenced by social 
heterogeneity that exists both between counties and states. As Paul Farmer 
quotes, "inequality itself constitutes our modern plague" [49]. H1N1 2009 
provided the opportunity to understand the health heterogeneity that prevails at 
county level in US. Deaths due to infectious disease are but a symptom of a 




crisis with the marginalization of a subgroup of the population [46-48]. Our 
study provides the additional evidence towards the quantification of this 
marginalization and provides the opportunity to locate the subgroups and 
nullify the heterogeneity effect with appropriate health related interventions. 
6.4. Summary 
Epidemiology involves the understanding of factors affecting the health of 
populations and serves as the basis for interventions made in the interest of 
public health. The decision tree methodology used here is a nonparametric 
approach that identifies the subgroups of a population whose members share 
common characteristics that influence the response variable of interest. In 
addition, the regression tree produces a visual output and simple rules that are 
easy to understand and interpret. This study is the first of its kind in which 
county-level data from the recent H1N1 pandemic was used to understand the 
effect of socio-economic determinants on H1N1 deaths. In addition, we have 
listed the possible counties to be targeted for health related interventions. If 
these results were to be used as the basis for decision-making, one would take 
note that larger differences exist in H1N1 deaths among the counties due to 
the socio-economic variables. If the health authorities intended to target only a 
few of the counties due to resource constraints, these decision rules can be of 
assistance. For example, according to these results, resources could be 
allocated to counties with low population density and low educational 
attainment. In addition, the health authorities of these counties can organize 
awareness programs and hence nullify the heterogeneity effect. This study 
provides a novel approach to use the collected data effectively to quantify the 
marginalization at each level, subgroup the population to be targeted and 




optimize the distribution of public health resources efficiently. H1N1 death 
related data has been documented at local, county, province, regional, state 
level in many countries. The respective state/county authorities can use these 
results as the basis to strategize health related interventions for future 
























7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Infectious disease outbreaks are a huge burden on health and social 
sectors, causing deaths, and severely impairing society and the economy. In-
silico intervention planning can benefit healthcare policy makers to design 
dynamic, optimal health interventions to counter disease outbreaks. A majority 
of the current research practice in intervention planning assumes complete 
knowledge of the disease-dynamics and consequently suffers the limitations of 
being static and being possibly ill-fitted to novel disease strains and evolving 
disease dynamics. The comparative analysis of inluenza vaccination programs 
implemented in practice [79] illustrates the need for techniques/approaches 
that constantly revise the status of disease outbreak with real epidemiological 
data, as and when such data are released by health authorities. Recent studies 
on mixing patterns relevant to the spread of infectious diseases [63] and 
severity estimates of H1N1 spread in the United States [64] provided us the 
opportunity to approach this research via a detailed 15 age-structured 
compartmental model and parameterize the model with reference to H1N1 
outbreak. In addition, intervention studies often ignore the effect of socio-
structural determinants on the spread of infectious diseases. Hence, a realistic 
model that incorporates the socio-structural understanding and techniques that 
constantly revise the decision making depending on the latest state of the 
system are needed. The research efforts for this thesis were dedicated towards 
addressing this need. 




7.1. Contributions of the research 
This research focused on using process systems engineering approaches to 
aid policy makers to make timely decisions to use the available resources 
optimally. The models and tools developed during the research are motivated 
towards designing effective health interventions and respond swiftly to a 
future infectious disease outbreak. The contributions of this research can be 
summarized as follows: 
 A 15 age-structured compartmental epidemiological model which can be 
used to simulate an epidemic spread among the US population was 
developed. A salient feature of this model is the age-wise stratification of 
risk factors relevant to the spread of an epidemic. This model has been 
calibrated for H1N1/09 scenario and validated using data from CDC, US. 
The H1N1 deaths predicted by the model was comparable to that of the 
deaths reported by CDC, while the H1N1 hospitalizations predicted were 
within the bounds of the confidence interval. The resultant R0 value 
evaluated from this calibration was 1.47. The supply of vaccines was 
modeled to match records of H1N1 vaccine shipment in the U.S. released 
by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) for the 
entire period of October 14, 2009 to January 27, 2010. This model was 
used to evaluate the performance of three adaptive vaccination schemes 
proposed in the literature. Our study reaffirmed the major role that 
vaccination programs have to play in the control of pandemic spreads. 
 A Non-linear Model Predictive Control scheme, a first of its kind, for the 
optimization of vaccine allocation strategies used in mass vaccination 
programs during influenza outbreaks was developed and investigated in 




this research. The vital role of NMPC was to serve as an optimal control 
strategy for minimizing deaths resulting from H1N1 infections by 
implementing an optimized series of vaccine allocation commensurate 
with the changing pandemic situation. In-silico epidemiological data 
collected at preset sampling intervals were used to estimate the age-wise 
vaccine allocation ratio (the optimal control action), which was then 
implemented on the virtual population until the next data sampling took 
place in a receding horizon framework. A variety of empirical scenarios 
were tested to individually consider the effects of R0, available vaccine 
stock and promptness of vaccination program on averting 
hospitalizations and deaths. Timely intervention efforts involving 
vaccination programs with sufficient amounts of vaccine stocks were 
potentially able to avert as much as over 99% of hospitalizations and 
deaths.  
 Efforts were then dedicated towards the development of a realistic four-
community agent based epidemiological system. The population of 2 
million agents was spread across 4 communities, with each community 
accommodating 0.5 million individuals. The key attributes of the agent 
based system include the community-specific heterogeneity in reporting 
of cases and hospitalizations and the movement of infected individuals 
between communities. This agent based system was then calibrated for 
H1N1/09 scenario and validated using data obtained from the 
compartmental epidemiological model corresponding to R0=1.8. H1N1 
deaths per 1000 and H1N1 hospitalizations per 1000 predicted by the 




agent-based model was comparable to that of the corresponding numbers 
estimated using the calibrated compartmental epidemiological model.  
 Online sampling of weekly data from the calibrated agent-based model 
was then used to estimate the age-wise vaccine allocation ratios using the 
Non-linear Model Predictive Control scheme. The control algorithm was 
used to estimate the number of vaccines to be administered for each age-
group for the subsequent week in the agent-based model. Control studies 
were conducted to analyze as to how the deaths/hospitalizations averted 
would vary depending upon whether the decisions were centralized or 
decentralized. The mismatch between actual and reported infections and 
hospitalizations, and the subsequent impact in controller performances 
were also evaluated. The NMPC-optimized vaccine allocation scheme 
was successful, being able to reduce deaths and hospitalizations from 
baseline levels by at least 76% and 73% respectively in all scenarios 
investigated. 
 In addition, subgroups of the population whose members share common 
characteristics that are barriers or facilitators of health-related 
interventions were identified. To this end, we used data collected from 
341 US counties to model H1N1 deaths per 1000 using twelve socio-
economic predictors to find out why certain counties reported fewer 
H1N1 deaths when compared with other counties. This study is, again, a 
first of its kind in which county-level data from the recent H1N1 
pandemic was used to understand the effect of socio-economic 
determinants on H1N1 deaths. We estimate that the recent H1N1 could 
have resulted in 7667 deaths in US. This estimate is in conformance with 




the lower bound of the CDC estimates of 8870 deaths. In addition, we 
have listed the possible counties to be targeted for health related 
interventions. If the health authorities intended to target only a few of the 
counties due to resource constraints, these decision rules can be of 
assistance. In addition, the health authorities of these counties can 
organize awareness programs and hence nullify the heterogeneity effect.  
 Lastly, other contributions of this research include the preliminary 
studies that were conducted to establish the future directions: (i) 
Development of a simple household-workplace-school structured agent-
based model to showcase the effect of information-diffusion during a 
disease outbreak, (ii) A particle-filter based approach for epidemic peak 
prediction using influence-like-illness data, and (iii) Geo-spatial mapping 
of epidemic-clusters using surveillance data.  
It is to be noted that the agent-based model and the NMPC-optimized 
vaccine allocation scheme proposed here is not solely specific to H1N1 
pandemic – it is also applicable to any highly infectious disease that can 
similarly spark off a pandemic. Once parameterized and calibrated accordingly 
for the particular outbreak, the NMPC scheme is likely to be similarly 
successful in optimally allocating vaccines for minimizing deaths, or 
hospitalizations, or whichever objective function is deemed to be appropriate.  
7.2. Recommendations for Future Work 
Preliminary studies were conducted to establish the future directions for 
this research. The published versions of these studies are included in the 
Appendix section of the thesis, highlighting the limitations of the current 




research and providing the directions towards fixing these limitations. This 
includes: 
 Developing a stochastic agent based model that incorporates the 
information feedback, through word of mouth, for vaccine intake 
(Appendix A), 
 Developing a particle filter based approach to forecast flu dynamics 
and estimate unknown/hidden parameters that characterize disease 
dynamics using surveillance data (Appendix B), and 
 Characterizing the time-varying diffusion pattern of H1N1 disease 
incidence and mortality using the weekly incidence data collected 
during the recent 2009 H1N1 flu epidemic, identifying the 
geographical regions at higher risk and developing spatiotemporal 
models for different time periods (Appendix C).  
In addition, future efforts should be dedicated to perform closed loop 
studies towards understanding, in detail, the controller’s stability to model 
errors and longer prediction window.  
7.2.1. Modeling Information Feedback during Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks   
Vaccine allocation based intervention planning discussed in Chapters 3 
through Chapter 5 do not consider people’s response in taking the vaccine 
with respect to the evolving characteristic of an epidemic. Intervention 
policies derived neglecting such feedback effects can be misleading in gauging 
the effectiveness of the recommended control strategies. To address this issue, 
we have developed a stochastic agent based model that includes the 
information feedback (through word of mouth) for vaccine intake. The details 




on the work and the findings are presented in Appendix A. The information 
flow among the agents regarding vaccine intake was modeled using diffusion 
theory. The model incorporates parameters from H1N1 2009 related studies.  
7.2.1 (a) Recommendation 
This approach can be extended to analyze how word of mouth influence is 
exerted into personal networks (at the micro level) and how it affects the 
macro evolution of the disease for different scenarios for the four-community 
agent-based model presented in Chapter 5. US county level [100] and state 
level [101] data on synthetic populations can be used to include the realistic 
household-workplace-school structure into the agent-based model. 
7.2.2. Forecasting Flu Dynamics Using a State Space Model 
Surveillance data gathered during H1N1 2009 outbreak can aid in the 
formulation of mathematical models used for forecasting flu dynamics. These 
models can help to predict the occurrence of the epidemic peak. Such early 
identification of epidemic peak can aid intervention planning. Traditionally, 
time-series models have been used for forecasting flu dynamics and peak 
detection. However, recent advances in systems and control theoryhave 
promoted the use of particle filters in the development of such models. State 
space models integrated with real-time observational data allows the 
estimation of unknown or hidden parameters that characterize disease 
dynamics. In this study (shown in Appendix B), we propose a particle filter 
approach to forecast flu dynamics. The proposed approach is an adapted 
version of a study done in Singapore [102]. The resampling procedure 
employed in that study was improved by using a systematic resampling 




algorithm. The systematic resampling of parameter space resulted in better 
state estimates and the approach was able to predict the ILI peak. However, 
the current approach suffers a serious limitation in its sensitivity towards the 
initial prior distribution assumed.  
7.2.2 (a) Recommendation 
The shortcomings of the current approach can be overcome by using a 
regionalized approach. Regionalized particle filters have been developed for 
monitoring influenza activity in France at the city-level, and the results 
produced have proven their practical applicability [103]. However, this 
approach has its own limitation like extensive data collection efforts, complex 
procedures to characterize the mixing pattern among the individuals, 
simplified assumptions regarding the disease transmission and ILI consultation 
etc., It is a well-known fact that population density in a particular region 
influences disease transmission. Similarly, average income influences ILI 
visits to GPFDs. Hence, future efforts shall be dedicated towards initializing 
the prior based on region-specific socio-demographic variables. Such 
regionalized models can provide good insight concerning the execution of 
efficient region-specific intervention plans for future pandemics. 
7.2.3. Geospatial Mapping of High-risk Epidemic Clusters Using Weekly 
Incidence Data 
The recent H1N1 pandemic revealed that certain geographical, social 
clusters are more susceptible to disease outbreaks than others. High-risk 
epidemic clusters are particular pockets of areas within the affected region that 
would be severely affected by epidemics than other parts of the region. Hence, 




it is critical to identify these susceptible clusters and increase disease-
monitoring/intervention-efforts over time in these areas. Analyzing the 
geographical spread of infectious diseases, identifying the statistically 
susceptible clusters at risk and developing geospatial models over time can aid 
better health care planning and management. The objectives of this study, 
presented in Appendix C, are to characterize the time-varying diffusion pattern 
of H1N1 disease incidence and mortality using the weekly incidence data, 
identify the geographical regions at higher risk and develop spatiotemporal 
models for different time periods. We have illustrated the proposed approach 
using weekly incidence data collected during the recent 2009 H1N1 flu 
epidemic from the state of Texas, USA.  
7.2.3. (a) Recommendation 
It is likely that the identified high-risk clusters of counties share similar 
characteristics that may promote the spread of diseases or intensify disease 
severity and impact. More research could be done in finding out what these 
characteristics are, and efforts can be undertaken in order to correct the 
situation to decrease susceptibility to disease spread or virulence in these 
clusters before the next epidemic strikes. As illustrated in Chapter 6, 
socioeconomic factors are significant contributors to increasing the number of 
deaths resulting from a disease outbreak. The recently released county health 
rankings [99] offers the potential to extend the proposed approach for many 
more predictors such as access to care, quality of care etc., Further research 
along these directions can hence aid healthcare authorities to develop region-
specific disease intervention policies to specifically curb the spread of the 
epidemic in these clusters and to effectively control the epidemic over the 
entire region as a whole. 
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In this chapter, we will present the findings from three preliminary studies 
that were conducted to establish future directions of this research. This 
includes: 
 Developing a stochastic agent based model that includes the 
information transmission feedback, through word of mouth, for 
vaccine intake (section 7.1), 
 Developing a particle filter based approach to forecast flu dynamics 
and estimate unknown/hidden parameters that characterize disease 
dynamics using surveillance data (section 7.2), and 
 Characterize the time-varying diffusion pattern of H1N1 disease 
incidence and mortality using the weekly incidence data collected 
during the recent 2009 H1N1 flu epidemic, identify the geographical 
regions at higher risk and develop spatiotemporal models for different 
time periods (section 7.3).  
 
A.1. Modeling Information Feedback during Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks  
Traditional methods of modeling intervention planning does not consider 
people’s response in taking the vaccine with respect to the evolving 
characteristic of an epidemic. Intervention policies derived neglecting such 
feedback effects can be misleading in gauging the effectiveness of the 
recommended control strategies. To address this issue, we have developed a 




stochastic agent based model by including the information transmission 
feedback (through word of mouth) for vaccine intake. The information flow 
among the agents regarding vaccine intake was modeled using diffusion 
theory. The model incorporates parameters from H1N1 2009 related studies. 
The developed model was then used to analyze how word of mouth influence 
is exerted into personal networks (at the micro level) and how it affects the 
macro evolution of the disease for different scenarios.  
A.1.1. Introduction 
Evidence from previous pandemics [104] show that individuals are most 
likely to change their behavior (travel, contact patterns, voluntary intake of 
vaccine etc.,) during an outbreak. Humans are the key entities of the network 
and the information transmission/diffusion during an outbreak can result in 
pandemic dynamics that is very different from the kind predicted by simplistic 
models in the literature [45]. In addition, the individual’s response in vaccine 
acceptance through word of mouth (WOM) have been discounted in the 
assessment of mitigation strategies. Capturing this feedback effect [105, 106] 
during such crisis can help the authorities to plan appropriately and address 
both the consequences of the direct effects of the pandemic and the indirect 
effects due to information transmission and other interventions. Agent based 
modeling [21, 22, 104] can handle the emergence property and the proposed 
approach exploits this advantage to improve the ability to predict and manage 
pandemics. In an effort to understand the role of information transmission 
during an epidemic outbreak and the way people react to the received 
information, a stochastic agent based model was developed to assess the 
spread of novel H1N1 virus in a virtual community. The model was used to 




study the effect of information flow through word-of-mouth influence on 
vaccine intake. The model allows us to analyze how the information flow is 
exerted into personal networks and how it affects the spread of the disease for 
various scenarios. Epidemiological data [107] ,[108-112] of Influenza A 
(H1N1 2009) was used to parameterize the model [113, 114]. Our model 
shows how the information diffusion significantly determines the shape and 
speed of the disease transmission.  
A.1.2. Methods 
A.1.2 (a) Role of information feedback in modeling vaccine intake 
The need to include information transmission in modeling vaccine intake 
is evident from evaluation studies described in the literature [115-117]. 
Immunization related services have often relied upon advertisements and 
word-of-mouth influence in a network to draw participants [117, 118]. This 
trend was evident during the recent H1N1 outbreak as well. The concept of 
positive feedback (recommendations in favor of vaccine) as drivers of 
information transmission/diffusion can be useful to study the spread dynamics. 
In this regard, we have developed an agent based model which incorporates 
both disease transmission and the information transmission in a given network 
setup. Here, the term "agent" refers to people and the term "network setup" 
refers to the virtual community in which people/agents "reside" and "interact".  
A.1.2 (b) The Agent based model 
We developed a stochastic agent based model with 19696 agents. The 
virtual community, mimicking reality, was created with a variety of 
establishments like households, work places, schools and the environment 




based on literature [119]. These establishments were allotted their respective 
coordinates. Varying sizes of realistic households were created and the agents 
were assigned their home, work, school and the places they visit in the 
environment. The total number of establishments for each category includes: 
 Total number of families in the virtual community (3378) 
 Total number of work places (325) 
 Total number of schools (20) 
 Total number of environments (20) 
The disease progression of an agent was modelled using a tailored 
stochastic version of the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected and Recovered (SEIR) 
model [16]. Each agent has a daily event chart which dictates his/her daily 
routine. This event chart includes the time at which an agent leaves the 
household, moves to work place, environment and returns back home. As 
mentioned earlier, agents have their respective home, work, schools (if the 
agent is a kid or teen), environment coordinates. These coordinates ensures 
that throughout the simulation, the agents visit only their allotted 
establishments and contact other agents who visit those establishments. Thus 
in our model, any susceptible agent can get the disease only when an infected 
agent is present nearby.  
A.1.2 (c)  Parameters of the agents 
Age-wise contact profiling, age-wise attack rate for infectivity and 
mortality were parameterized based on H1N1 study and other literature 
evidences. The age-wise infection rate was parameterized from the study done 
in China [108]. The age-wise mortality rate (deaths per 100000) was 
parameterized from the study done in England [110]. Contact profiling of the 




public in eight European countries [111] was used as a basis for assuming the 
contacts per day of the agents. The category-wise parameters used in the 
model is shown in Table A.1. The simulation starts with four randomly 
infected agents from each category. In this model, agents alter their 
vaccination choice in response to influence from other agents in their personal 
network. The model was then used to answer the following queries: 
 For a given network, how do the model parameters influence the 
spread of disease? 
 How do the disease transmission vary for different second wave 
scenarios? 











1. Kids 2984 23.5 11 15 
2. Teens 3030 48.6 12 20 
3. Adults 9623 18.3 30 15 
4. Aged 4059 4.9 65 10 
A.1.2 (d) Disease transmission model 
The tailored stochastic version of SEIR-model is shown in the disease 
progression statechart given in  Figure A.1. Every agent enters the disease 
progression statechart and moves sequentially through to other states 
depending upon the events that occur around it. Thus, the current state of an 
agent is purely influenced by the events that occur in their environment. As 
soon as the agent enters the statechart, there will be a check for immunity. 
This check is based on the agent's immune probability. Since we are modeling 




an epidemic outbreak, it is assumed that the entire population is susceptible 
and hence all the agents will move to the next state - "Susceptible".  
In our model, any susceptible agent can get the disease based on the 
multiplicative combination of two factors: (i) the infection probability of the 
strain and (ii) the category-wise infection rate of the agent. Here, the infection 
probability of the strain corresponds to the likelihood that a contact with an 
infectious agent results in an infection. The infection rate corresponds to the 
category-wise susceptibility to succumb to the strain. This category-wise 
infection rate is assumed based on H1N1 studies done in the literature. An 
agent who is infected leaves the "Susceptible" state and enters the "Exposed" 
state. The agent stays in this state for a period defined by latency. During this 
latency period, the agent does not show symptoms. Also, the agent is not 
infectious. After the latency period, the agent then moves to "Infectious" state, 
wherein s/he will not show symptoms but is infectious. The agent stays in the 
infectious state for a period defined by incubation. During this period, the 
agent can infect other agents in his/her network. The rate of infection is 
defined by the physical contacts of the agent. After the incubation period, 
depending upon the severity of the infection, defined by severity rate, the 
agent moves to either of these states: "Mildly Infected" or "Severely Infected". 
If the agent is mildly infected, s/he recovers after the incubation period, 
becomes immune and is not infectious any more. However, if the agent 
proceeds to "Severely Infected" state, the agent becomes symptomatic and 
remains infectious till the illness duration. The symptomatic agents will be 
treated with antivirals and isolated. On any given day, in the morning, if the 
agent does not show symptoms, he/she will go to work. Similarly, after the 




day's work, if the  agent does not show symptoms, he/she will go to the 
environment, else, they will move to the house. For agents who recieve the 
antiviral treatment, it is assumed that the illness duration of the treated agents 
reduces by 1 to 2 days [69]. The agents on antiviral therapy are considered to 
be less infective [69] and hence it is assumed that, during their stay in the 
house, they infect only the high risk groups (kids and aged) in their household. 
The heterogeneity in the severity of infection for different agents is captured 
by the stochastic parameterization of the ilnness duration, using a triangular 
distribution, based on the literature evidence [108]. After the illness duration, 
an agent succumbs to death based on death rate. Those who escape death, 
recover and become immune to the virus. 
 
Figure A. 1 Disease progression statechart of an agent 




A.1.2 (e) Information transmission model 
The information flow among the agents regarding vaccine intake was 
modeled using diffusion theory. This model explicitly includes agent's 
decision-making on vaccine acceptance which may be affected by two factors: 
(1) external influence via advertising by the Health officials and mass media 
and (2) internal societal influence via word-of-mouth. Here, it was assumed 
that a severe infection/death among the agents in their personal network would 
influence other agents in that network to take the vaccine. When an agent 
remains safe after vaccination or becomes severely infected or dies, other 
agents in his/her network would take the vaccine at the rate of contacts per day 
times the message adoption fraction. Message adoption fraction refers to the 
fraction with which agents respond to the message from other agents in their 
personal network. Agents who are influenced to take the vaccine, move from 
the "Susceptible" state to "Ready To Take" state based on either of these 
transitions: 1) Rate triggered transition, based on advertisement effect and 2) 
Message triggered transition, based on recommendations from other agents. 
However, these agents remain susceptible until the vaccine is available. Once 
the vaccine arrives, agents in this state move to "Waiting" state. Depending 
upon the rate at which the doses are administered, the agents move from this 
state to the "Vaccinated" state. Until vaccinated, an agent is still prone to 
infection. Here, it has to be noted that, in reality, mildly infected agents do not 
show symptoms. Hence, when the vaccine is available, the mildly infected 
agents may also take the vaccines, without knowing that they are immune to 
the disease. Hence, our model includes this realistic component, wherein, the 
mildly infected agents will also move to the "Waiting" state and take the 




vaccine once available. The parameters of the environment and the agents are 
listed in Table A.2 and Table A.3 respectively. 
Table A. 2 Parameters of the environment 
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D 0.1 Model assumption 
D- Deterministic; Dy- Dynamic 
The commercial package AnyLogic was used to build the model. The 
developed model was then used to analyze how word of mouth influence is 
exerted into personal networks (at the micro level) and how it affects the 
macro evolution of the disease for different scenarios. The model is run over 
time for a period of 100 days and repeated 100 times to obtain a distribution of 
possible outcomes. The mean and standard deviation of the 100 runs are 




reported as results. To assess the severity of the outbreak, the basic 
reproduction number, R0 was calculated using the procedure discussed in the 
literature [69]. R0 refers to the number of secondary infections produced by a 
randomly infected person in a fully susceptible population. A randomly 
selected infected agent was introduced at the beginning of the simulation, with 
every other agent’s ability to transmit assumed to be zero. We then counted 
the number of secondary infections. This procedure was run for 100 times and 
the mean value was found to be 1.77. 
Table A. 3 Parameters of the agent 
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D 0 Because H1N1 is a novel virus. 







D 0.33 Model assumption 
8 Severity rate D 0.33 Literature [19, 69] 
D- Deterministic; S- Stochastic; 
A.1.3. Results and Discussion 
A.1.3 (a) Parameter variation study 
The developed model was then simulated to study the effect of infection 
probability and message adoption fraction on the disease progression. Table 
A.4 shows how the change in these input parameters affect the output. The 
model was first simulated for a reference scenario with the parameter values 
reported in Tables 7.1.2 and 7.1.3. Simulation runs 1 through 8 show the effect 
of infection probability and message adoption fraction on the % infected and 
% vaccinated. The % change in infection reported for these 8 runs are with 
respect to the reference scenario. From Table A.4, it is evident that a decrease 
in infection probablitity or an increase in message adoption fraction decreases 
the % infection. Also, the increase in infection probablitity or a decrease in 
message adoption fraction increases the % infection. A lower infection 
probability of 0.11 and 0.22 results in lowering the % infection by 97.5%. 
Similarly, a higher message adoption fraction of 0.75 and 1.0, in comparison 
with the 0.5 value assumed for the reference scenario, results in lowering the 
% infection by 67.5% and 82.5% respectively. Increase in infection 
probability to 0.44 and 0.55 increases the % infection by 200 and 287.5% 
resepctively, which seems to be an obvious inference.  




However, it has to be noted that a decrease in message adoption fraction to 
0 results in an increase in infection by 180%. The percentage reduction is 
similar to the effect of increased infection probability, which underlines the 
importance of information transmission in controlling the spread of infectious 
disease outbreaks. 
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Note: The values reported in the parenthesis refer to the standard deviation 
of the output variable of interest from 100 runs. 




A.1.3 (b) Effect of second wave mutation of infection probability on 
disease/information transmission 
With the sensitivity analysis done, the model was then simulated to study 
the effect of change in infection probability on disease/information 
transmission (with respect to the second wave). The variation in second wave 
parameters considered here are in accordance with the perspective given in the 
literature [121]. Table A.4 summarizes the second wave parameters for 
different scenarios and the respective output. Here, it has to noted that the 2
nd
 
wave is implemented with respect to the start of the annual flu season in the 
United States. H1N1 2009 outbreak occurred during the off-season. October 
marks the start of the flu season and the 2
nd
 wave implementation here is 
attributed to the change in climate.  














































































Note: The values reported in the parenthesis refer to the standard 
deviation of the output variable of interest from 100 runs. 
 




A conventional model without considering the information transmission 
would have predicted a higher/lower infection % for an increased/decreased 
second wave infection probability. However, the results reported in Table A.4 
implies otherwise. From Table A.4, it is evident that even if the infection 
probability  increases from 0.33 to 0.55 by the mutation period (60 days as per 
the assumption), the infection increases only by 10%. This can be attributed to 
the transmission of information among the agents. In our model, it was 
assumed that a severe infection among family members and/or friends would 
influence the agents to buy the vaccine based on the individual agent's 
adoption rate at the network level. Hence, with the agents getting infected 
during the first wave, the number of agents waiting to get vaccinated increases 
and thus reduces the impact of severe second wave strain.  
Our results demonstrate that the disease progression with the word of 
mouth influence is very different from that predicted by conventional models 
without the inclusion of the information transmission/diffusion. The individual 
role of disease transmission and the information transmission in the spread 
dynamics can be well estimated from the results we have shown here. For 
example, it is often reported that the virus exploits the network that exists in a 
community and spreads the disease all over the network. However, the same 
network setup provides the agents to communicate about the outbreak thereby 
effecting the change in agents behavior. Hence, exact information on the 
symptoms of the disease, availability of antivirals, severity of the virus, risk of 
death etc., should be made public as and when available. These information 
would make sure that the vaccination coverage remain optimal during the 
second wave.  




Vaccination and the effect of different rates of vaccination have been 
considered in earlier modeling studies and projected to be a useful measure to 
counter the spread of pandemic infections. However, how the vaccine intake 
of the agents varies with respect to the characteristic of an epidemic outbreak 
has never been studied in the past. Given the uncertainties associated with the 
current outbreak, the variability in disease processes, the individual’s response 
in vaccine intake, vaccination policies derived from these models may not be 
robust. Hence the conclusions derived out of such negligence can be 
misleading in gauging the effectiveness of the recommended strategies.  
A.1.4. Summary 
In an effort to understand the role of information feedback in vaccine 
intake and its consequent impact on the disease spread, a stochastic agent 
based model was used to assess the impact of various scenarios on the spread 
of the novel influenza A (H1N1 2009) virus in a virtual community. This 
agent-based model includes the information diffusion feedback in disease 
control and vaccine intake. The proposed model allows us to analyze how 
word of mouth influence is exerted into personal networks and how it affects 
the disease dynamics. Our model incorporates parameters from very recent 
H1N1 2009 related studies. The application of the model was shown through 
simulations for various possible scenarios and this model can be used to derive 
optimal intervention strategies for a future outbreak.  
A.2. Forecasting Flu Dynamics Using a State Space Model 
Surveillance data gathered during H1N1 2009 outbreak can aid in the 
formulation of mathematical models used for forecasting flu dynamics. These 




models can help to predict the occurrence of the epidemic peak. Such early 
identification of epidemic peak can aid intervention planning. Traditionally, 
time-series models have been used for forecasting flu dynamics and peak 
detection. However, recent advances in computational infrastructure have 
promoted the use of particle filters in the development of such models. State 
space models integrated with real-time observational data allows the 
estimation of unknown or hidden parameters that characterize disease 
dynamics. In this work, we propose a particle filter approach to forecast flu 
dynamics. The proposed approach is an adapted version of a study done in 
Singapore [102]. The resampling procedure employed in that study was 
improved by using a systematic resampling algorithm. The systematic 
resampling of parameter space resulted in better state estimates and the 
approach was able to predict the ILI surge registered around Day 40. Section 
7.2.1 will highlight the particle filter approach used in this work. The steps 
involved in the algorithm are explained in detail in Section 7.2.2. The 
simulation results and the state/parameter estimates obtained using the real-
time data (from GPFDs, taken from the Singapore study) are shown in Section 
7.2.3. 
A.2.1. Particle Filter Approach 
A.2.1 (a) Particle Filters 
Particle filters or sequential Monte Carlo methods have been extensively 
used in target tracking (robotics) and state/parameter estimation (chemical 
processes [122, 123]). These applications provide a valuable insight into the 
usefulness of particle filters and its possible extension into epidemiology. The 
application of particle filters in state estimation uses the concept of recursive 




Bayesian estimation. Here, the outcome of a future state is approximated using 
incoming measurements and the knowledge obtained concerning the current 
state recursively.  
A.2.1 (b) The General State Space Model 
The state space formulation used in particle filters is a general, discrete-time 
nonlinear, non-Gaussian dynamic system, which can be expressed as: 
    (              )                                                                   (A.2.1) 
    (        )                                                                    (A.2.2) 
where  x = state, y = noisy observation,  u = known input,    = system 
noise and ν = measurement noise. 
The objective of particle filters is to determine the current state xk given a 
set of noisy observations y1:k = {y1, y2, … , yk-1, yk} and an initial guess x0. 
Disturbances in the system are represented by the system noise and any 
inaccuracies present in the measurements are modeled by the measurement 
noise. 
A.2.1 (c) The Epidemic Model 
The disease progression was modeled using a tailored version of the 
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected and Recovered (SEIR) model [124]. The SEIR 
model is a compartmental model, where individuals move from stage to stage 
according to a set of predetermined equations. The following equations used in 
the SEIR model define the state space of the particle filter: 
                                                                                          (A.2.3) 
                                                                                 (A.2.4) 
                                                                                 (A.2.5)  




                       (A.2.6) 
Here, S represents individuals susceptible to H1N1 and A refers to those 
who are newly infected. E represents individuals exposed to the virus, I refers 
to those who are infectious, B represents the newly infectious and C refers to 
those who are removed. R refers to individuals who have recovered from the 
disease. A, B and C are assumed to follow binomial distributions as shown 
below:  
      (          {            })                      (A.2.7)    
          (          {    })                                                       (A.2.8)                                                                 
          (          {    })                                                      (A.2.9) 
where N = total population. 
Considering that for a binomial distribution of X ~ Bin(n,p) its expectation 
is given as  
E(X) = np, the SEIR model equations or state evolution equations for the 
particle filter are: 
             {       (       )   }                  (A.2.10) 
             {       (       )   }          
   (    )               (A.2.11) 
                   (    )             (    )      (A.2.12) 
                   (    )                                          (A.2.13) 
The parameters of the SEIR model include β, ε, λ, and γ. The exact values of 
these parameters are unknown and only approximations of their distributions 
can be used as the prior guesses. The particle filter utilizes the following prior 
distributions for the various parameters and states (shown in Table A.6). The 
prior distributions are region-specific and hence, were adapted from the study 




done in Singapore [102]. [N
+(μ,σ2) is the modified normal distribution such 
that if X ~ N
+(μ,σ2) then Y ~ N(μ,σ2) and that X = |Y|]. Here, it has to be noted 
that half-normal distributions of these parameters resulted in poor estimates 
than modified normal distributions. Hence, the priors were defined using 
modified normal distribution.  
Table A. 6 Prior distributions for particle filter 
Parameters States 
β ~ N+(1.2,0.8) 
ε ~ N+(30,15) 
λ ~ N+(1,1) 
γ ~ N+(2,0.5) 
ϕ ~ N+(0.5,0.25) 
δ ~ N+ (0.05,0.1) 











R(0) = 0 
A.2.1 (d)  The Observation Model 
The observation model will describe the characteristics of the data submitted 
by the doctors and is represented by a Poisson distribution: 
       (    )                                                                            (A.2.14) 
where D is the total number of ILIs registered on a particular day t through the 
data submitted by N (known) GPFDs on that day, with   referring to the 
average number of H1N1 ILIs being reported as per GPFD.   
                              {                       }      (A.2.15) 
Here, δ refers to the probability associated with an individual visiting a 
GPFD for ILI related symptoms and   represents the background consulting 
rate for non-A/H1N1 ILIs. Hence, the term δ  refers to the daily consulting 
rate for ILIs per GPFD in the absence of a A/H1N1 pandemic. In addition, the 




term δI describes the consulting rate for ILIs per GPFD pertaining to A/H1N1 
infection.  
A.2.2. Particle Filter Algorithm 
The particle filter algorithm used in our work involves six different steps as 
described below: 
A.2.2 (a) Initialization 
The first step of the algorithm involves initializing p parameter sets from the 
established prior distributions for β, γ, δ, ε, λ, and ϕ (each set denoted as θ) at 
t=0. Similarly, p initial states of S, E, I and R were simulated from their prior 
distributions (each set denoted as Σ0). The p aggregations of varying parameter 
sets and states shall correspond to p particles, where each particle at time t is a 
vector given as xt = (Σt, θ), with an assigned weight of qt = 1 / p. Here, 10000 
particles were used. 
A.2.2 (b) Propagation/Iteration 
The next step involves the propagation of the pre-defined particles forward 
in time using the state space model defined by equations 7.2.10-7.2.13. 
A.2.2 (c) Weighting 
For each particle, its weight after the propagation step shall be updated using 
qt+t = qt * Lt+1 where Lt+1 is the likelihood contribution. Considering that Lt+1 = 
f(Dt+1 | xt+1) we were able to derive the following: 
      (         )   (         )   (         )                (A.2.16) 
Here, p(Dt+1 | xt+1) computes the probability closeness of the propagated 
vector against the actual observation data. The objective here is to determine It 
(along with other states) given a set of noisy observations Dt-1 and an initial 




guess θ. In the process of determining the current state, the estimation of 
hidden system parameters from the initialization step upto any given time step 
can be done using particles which best represent the system. This step of the 
algorithm updates the weight of each particle based on likelihood contribution 
by comparing the estimated states with the actual observation data. The 
likelihood function of a model x → f(x | θ) can be written as L(θ | x) = f(x | θ). 
Hence, the likelihood function can be represented using a probability density 
function of f(x | θ). Noting that the assumption of only those who are being 
infected seek consultations from GPFDs, and that the format of the 
observation model is a poisson distribution, essentially for each particle p(Dt+1 
| xt+1) is computed such that: 
   (         )  { (    )            (     )}  (        )       (A.2.17) 
where the last term on the right is based on the probability density function of 
the poisson distribution. Iactual refers to the actual number of infectious 
individuals. Subsequently each weight is being normalised such that qt+1* = 
qt+1 / Σqt+1 (for all particles). 
A.2.2 (d) Resampling 
This step involves the systematic-resampling procedure to avoid particle 
degeneracy. Resampling is an approach used to counter particle degeneracy 
and primarily involves the elimination of particles with low importance 
weights while multiplying those of high importance weights, and maintaining 
the same number of particles in the sample pool. It is typically performed 
when significant degeneracy occurs (after the normalization of importance 
weights). A measure of particle degeneracy is given by the computation of 
Neff: 




       Σ   ( ) 
                                                                 (A.2.18)
 
where qk(i) is the normalized weight of the i-th particle. However, this step of 
the algorithm suffers the serious limitation of sample impoverishment. Use of 
kernel smoothing can reduce the severity of sample impoverishment by 
generating new parameter values within the neighborhood of the resampled 
particles.  
A.2.2 (e) Kernel Smoothing 
The existing vector xt+1* would be subjected to a kernel smoothing function 





]. Z shall be generated from a multivariate Gaussian distribution with 
mean vector 0 and a variance provided by the variance-covariance matrix of 
xt+1* for all p particles. μt+1 is the mean of xt+1* for all p particles. The 
bandwidth, h, is set to 0.3.  
A.2.2 (f) Increment and prediction 
Observation data of daily H1N1 ILI visits per GPFD were obtained from the 
Singapore case study [102]. This data was available over a period of 72 days. 
Hence, efforts were made to use data from the first few days, update the 
parameters, states and forecast the ILI visits per GPFD for the next one week. 
Here, the number of days used to train the parameters is defined as the 
“Training Window”. For example, the 1st training window refers to using the 
ILI visits data from the first 5 days. The subsequent training windows refer to 
every additional week data included to the previous training window. Steps A 
to E shall be performed up to the length of the chosen training window and 
subsequently, only step B would be repeated to forecast for the next one week. 
The propagation of ILI visits over this forecast period and the parameter 




estimates corresponding to the last time step of the respective training window 
are presented as the prediction results. Here, it has to be noted that the kernel 
smoothing function alters the parameter values (after the resampling 
procedure) to generate p new parameter sets at every time step. The parameter 
estimates reported here corresponds to the parameter set, p, which survives the 
kernel smoothing procedure. The algorithm was coded in MATLAB and the 
flowchart of the algorithm is shown in Figure A.2. 
ITERATION: For Day 2–DayTrain
Start
INITIALIZATION: Simulate an initial set of 
parameters, state vectors and weights for 
each of a particular number of particles
Input observations
Update set of parameters, state vectors and weights 
based on values of those on the previous day
Perform Systematic Resampling
Perform Kernel Smoothing
PREDICTION: For DayTrain+1– Day Predict
Predict set of parameters, state vectors and weights 
based on values of those on the previous day
End
 
Figure A. 2  Particle Filter algorithm 
A.2.3. Results and Discussion 
The proposed approach was able to identify the exact time at which the peak 
of H1N1 occurred in Singapore. The systematic resampling algorithm used in 
our approach resulted in better parameter estimates when compared with that 
in the literature [102]. A detailed chart showing the forecasts of ILI visits with 
respect to the Training Window (TW) is shown in Figure A.3. A compiled plot 




of the forecasts using the first 5 days data through the last day is shown in 
Figure A.4. From Figure A.3, it is evident that the forecast results generated 
using observation data from the first few weeks had over-predicted the ILI 
visits. This is similar to the results published in the study [102], and can be 
attributed to not providing sufficient time for convergence of the various 
parameters. However, the magnitude of prediction error using our approach is 
much lesser than the error reported in the reference case study. In addition, the 
forecast of 6 ILI visits obtained from our approach (plot "C" of Figure A.3 - 
corresponding to the 6
th
 week) is relatively better than the 8 ILI visits 
predicted using the random resampling algorithm.   
The proposed approach was then used to estimate the parameters and study 
how the estimates varied over the training window. The mean values of the 6 
parameters with respect to the training window are as shown in Table A.7. The 
parameter values estimated using a training window of 65 days are shown in 
Table A.8. The estimates obtained using our approach is comparable with the 
H1N1 studies done in the literature [102, 108] 




Figure A. 3  Comparison between actual data and predicted with respect to 
training window 
 








Table A. 7 Mean Parameter Values with respect to Training window (TW) 
TW beta delta epsilon gamma lambda phi 
1 1.20 0.51 28.77 1.90 0.88 3.20 
2 1.50 0.43 28.50 3.64 3.17 2.39 
3 1.26 0.81 30.70 2.36 2.66 3.44 
4 1.08 1.00 32.57 4.28 2.79 3.70 
5 1.92 1.00 33.67 3.02 4.08 3.57 
6 1.98 1.00 32.31 3.47 4.74 5.67 
7 1.55 0.41 33.71 3.31 5.16 3.91 
8 2.85 0.67 32.54 2.84 4.44 4.32 
9 1.76 0.59 32.39 2.16 4.18 3.48 
10 3.59 0.51 33.58 2.47 3.19 3.91 
 
Table A. 8 Parameter values estimated using a training window of 65 days 
No. Parameters Mean Value Standard Deviation 
1 beta 3.6 0.99 
2 epsilon 33.6 1.0 
3 lambda 3.2 1.0 
4 gamma 2.5 1.0 
5 phi 3.9 0.99 
6 delta 0.51 0.15 
A.2.4. Summary 
The emergence of H1N1 in 2009 and a subsequent pandemic onset 
illustrated the importance of developing effective models with useful 




predictive capabilities for infectious diseases. In this regard, we have proposed 
a particle filter approach using the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected and 
Recovered (SEIR) epidemic model. The epidemic model was integrated with 
an observation model characterizing real-time influenza-like illnesses (ILI) 
data originating from general practice / family doctors (GPFDs) located in 
Singapore. The systematic resampling algorithm used in our approach resulted 
in better parameter estimates and the approach was able to predict the ILI 
peak. The early identification of epidemic peaks can help the authorities to 
strategize effective intervention plans. 
 
A.3. Geospatial Mapping of High-risk Epidemic Clusters Using 
Weekly Incidence Data 
The recent H1N1 pandemic revealed that certain geographical, social 
clusters are more susceptible to disease outbreaks than others. High-risk 
epidemic clusters are particular pockets of areas within the affected region that 
would be severely affected by epidemics than other parts of the region. Hence, 
it is critical to identify these susceptible clusters and increase disease-
monitoring/intervention-efforts over time in these areas. Analyzing the 
geographical spread of infectious diseases, identifying the statistically 
susceptible clusters at risk and developing geospatial models over time can aid 
better health care planning and management. Healthcare authorities can 
develop area-specific disease intervention policies to specifically curb the 
spread of the epidemic in these clusters, so as to effectively control the 
epidemic over the entire region as a whole. The objectives of this section are 
to characterize the time-varying diffusion pattern of H1N1 disease incidence 




and mortality using the weekly incidence data, identify the geographical 
regions at higher risk and develop spatiotemporal models for different time 
periods. We have illustrated the proposed approach using weekly incidence 
data collected during the recent 2009 H1N1 flu epidemic from the state of 
Texas in the United States of America 
A.3.1. Methods 
A.3.1 (a) Data Extraction 
Data required for this work was extracted from the Texas Department of 
State Health Services Influenza website, under the Flu Surveillance Data 
Archives [125]. The data was provided in the form of detailed tabulated 
reports that specifically documented the cumulative number of 
hospitalizations, ICU cases and deaths in each Texan county that resulted from 
infection by the influenza A virus subtype H1N1. The incidence data covered 
the period of the height of the H1N1 flu epidemic in Texas, with reports for 
every week from the 26
th
 of September 2009 till the 22
nd
 of May 2010. The 
data was processed to reflect the number of new cases every week instead of 
cumulative cases, and grouped into eight time periods for each month covered 
in the study. Additionally, it was necessary to obtain geographical data as well 
as population data for each of the counties. Geographical data was relevant as 
the number of cases in neighboring counties could be strongly correlated, with 
the H1N1 virus possibly spreading from one county to a neighboring county. 
Population data was relevant as comparisons between counties should be done 
only after taking their different population numbers into account, by 
normalizing the number of cases with respect to population numbers of each 




county. Such population data, latitude and longitude information for each 
county were extracted and compiled from the TownsUSA website [126]. 
A.3.1 (b) Spatiotemporal Modeling 
Spatiotemporal modeling is a technique that utilizes the concept that 
geographical region closer to one another is similar in characteristics than 
those further apart. It is implied that areas geographically close to one another 
are likely to have similar levels of susceptibility to epidemics. Such grouping 
would facilitate the strategizing of epidemic monitoring and management 
efforts. The Software for the Spatial, Temporal, and Space-Time Scan 
Statistics, or SaTScan™ [127], was utilized for analysis of the provided Texas 
incidence data. The extracted incidence data for each county, as well as the 
respective geographical and population data, were inputted into SaTScan™.  
Discrete Poisson probability models of the georeferenced datasets were then 
developed for each time period using retrospective space-time analysis, with 
time aggregation set as a week in accordance with the weekly H1N1 reports. 
The statistically significant clusters obtained for each time period was then 
grouped into primary and secondary clusters. Time aggregation was set to 
exactly one week in order to reflect that the incidence data used were weekly 
reports. 
A.3.2. Results and Discussion 
The compiled results from our analysis are displayed in Table A.9, depicting 
the identified high-risk hospitalizations, ICU cases and deaths clusters in the 
State of Texas from October 2009 to May 2010. Our analysis shows that the 
number of counties grouped and the number of clusters varies with respect to 
time. The geospatial model for the 1
st
 time period resulted in 29 counties 




clustered in 4 groups, with 20 of them grouped as the most likely clusters. The 
model corresponding to the last time period resulted in 36 counties grouped as 
a single most likely cluster. From our analysis, it is evident that the counties in 
the southeast region of Texas were severely affected during the initial stages 
of the H1N1 outbreak.  
In accordance to the legend for each choropleth map, the most darkly 
colored clusters of counties indicate the most statistically significant cluster 
identified to be at high-risk during the 2009 H1N1 flu epidemic. These Rank 1 
Clusters, or Primary Clusters, are the most likely to encompass counties with 
the largest disparity in actual numbers of cases above what would be expected, 
considering a discrete Poisson distribution of number of cases after 
normalizing for the different population numbers in each county. 
Less darkly colored clusters are Secondary Clusters of Rank 2 onwards that 
are increasingly less likely to encompass the most problematic high-risk 
clusters as the intensity of the shading decreases. Finally, uncolored clusters 
encompass counties with actual numbers of cases significantly in agreement 
with expected numbers, or even enjoying unexpectedly low numbers of H1N1 
cases. 
A.3.2 (a) High-Risk Areas Identified 
The Western part of Texas was at high-risk only at the initial phase of the 
epidemic (from October to November 2009 for hospitalization and ICU cases, 
and from November to December 2009 for deaths cases). It is possible that the 
epidemic first started in this part of Texas and spread out to the rest of the state 
from here, which will have to be confirmed by further research. However, this 
Western cluster does not reappear again in 2010, possibly pointing to an 




effective epidemic control program in place that limited the peak of the 
epidemic here to the early phase in late 2009.  
Clusters located in Central Texas do not appear a lot and are not of much 
significance as compared to the next two regions to be discussed. There was a 
sporadic appearance for deaths in November and December 2009 that seems 
likely to have been an extension of the Western cluster.  
Clusters located in the East, like the case for Central Texas, appear very late 
into the epidemic, in from March to April 2010 for hospitalization and ICU 
cases, and from April to May 2010 for deaths cases. However, in contrast to 
Central Texas, this Eastern cluster has a sustained appearance of two months, 
making it more significant than the sporadic appearance of the Central cluster. 
The peaking of the Eastern cluster this late into the epidemic highlights this 
area as a secondary high-risk cluster that has taken a rather long time to 
contain the effects of the epidemic. 
Clusters in the South were very consistently identified for all three types of 
variables, from October to November 2009 and from January to April 2010, 
over long periods of the study, and very often appeared as Rank 1 Primary 
clusters. This shows that counties to the south of Texas have, over nearly the 
entire course of the epidemic, failed to manage to lower their numbers of 
hospitalization, ICU and deaths cases to near a state-level average. As 
compared to other parts of Texas, this seems to be the worst-hit area, and 
healthcare resources could be channelled here away from other areas that have 
managed to keep the epidemic well under control. If epidemics are allowed to 
sustain themselves in a part of the region, such as the 2009 flu epidemic 
staying rampant here in Southern Texas, this area would be a hotbed of disease 




activity from which the disease can continue to propagate and spread out back 
to other parts of the region. 
Table A. 9 Identified high-risk hospitalizations, ICU cases and deaths clusters in 
the State of Texas from October 2009 to May 2010 
 Hospitalizations ICU Cases Deaths 
Oct 
09 
   
Nov 
09 
   
Dec 
09 
   
Jan 10 
   
Feb 
10 
   
Mar 
10 
   






   
May 
10 
   
A.3.3. Summary 
From our analysis, it is evident that the weekly incidence data collected 
during the H1N1 pandemic can be used to develop geospatial models to 
support the development of localized interventions. Our analysis shows that 
the number of counties grouped and the number of clusters varies with respect 
to time. The geospatial model for the 1
st
 time period resulted in 29 counties 
clustered in 4 groups, with 20 of them grouped as the most likely clusters. The 
model corresponding to the last time period resulted in 36 counties grouped as 
a single most likely cluster. Our results show that the counties in the southeast 
region of Texas were severely affected during the initial stages of the H1N1 
outbreak. The main application of our approach is that it provides supportive 
evidence to aid health care planning and management at county-level. County-
level health officials can use these results to strategize their resource 
management policies and mitigation measures during a future epidemic 
outbreak like the recent H1N1. These high-risk clusters can be the targets of 
intensified healthcare efforts in improving emergency aid resources so as to 
alleviate the damaging consequences of future epidemics. 
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